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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." An individual may assert this privilege
against self-incrimination at any stage in a criminal or a civil proceed-
ing, including a bankruptcy proceeding.1
The primary purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination is
to "avoid confronting the witness with the 'cruel trilemma' of self-accu-
sation, perjury or contempt."2 In a criminal case, an individual who
successfully invokes the privilege need not choose among these
equally unattractive alternatives. He may remain silent, leaving the
government to meet its burden of proof without his forced assistance.3
It is of no concern that the individual may be guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.4 "[It is] better for an occasional crime to go un-
punished than that the prosecution should be free to build up a crimi-
nal case, in whole or in part, with the assistance of enforced
disclosures by the accused." 5
In a civil case, however, an individual who asserts her Fifth
Amendment rights may be confronted with an additional dilemma. If
she chooses to remain silent to avoid potential criminal liability, she
may jeopardize her civil action or defense. On the other hand, if she
testifies in support of her civil action or defense, she may expose her-
self to the risk of making potentially incriminating statements that
the government could use against her in a subsequent criminal
proceeding.
1. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S.
34, 40 (1924); Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170,
175 (2d Cir. 1984); Charter Fed. Sav. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140 B.R.
49, 52 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Endres (In re En-
dres), 103 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); Olson v. Potter (In re Potter), 88
B.R. 843, 849 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1988); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430 (Bankr.
N.D. 1. 1986). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 501 (general rule on privileges); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 9017 (evidence).
2. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir.
1984)(quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
3. In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988)(citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 7 (1964)).
4. Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which serves to protect both the guilty and the
innocent from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination primarily serves to protect the guilty. Marine
Midland Bank, N.A. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989). "[Ihe privilege [against self-incrimination] is designed to protect the tes-
timony of a party or non-party witness which might later tend to subject that
person to criminal prosecution." Id. (alterations in original)(emphasis added).
See also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977); McCarthy v. Arnd-
stein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
5. United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1978)(quoting Maffie v.
United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954)).
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This dilemma frequently arises in bankruptcy cases. The "right to
remain silent" is often in direct conflict with a bankruptcy debtor's
obligation to disclose the particulars of his financial affairs.6 "Mhe
bankruptcy process places greater emphasis on full disclosure of an
individual's financial affairs for the benefit of all creditors of the
debtor's estate and thus affords the debtor only a thin shield against
wide-ranging discovery."7
Such a conflict may arise in connection with, among other things,
the preparation and filing of the debtor's schedules and statements;8
the debtor's testimony at the meeting of creditors;9 the debtor's testi-
mony at any examination ordered by the court;3o the debtor's response
to a complaint either to determine the dischargeability of a debt" or
to deny the debtor a discharge;12 the debtor's efforts to confirm a plan
of reorganization;13 the debtor's preparation and filing of periodic op-
erating reports;' 4 the debtor's response to a motion to convert or dis-
miss the case;' 5 and the debtor's response to a motion to appoint a
trustee or examiner16 or to remove the debtor as debtor in
possession.17
The debtor is not the only party protected by the-Fifth Amendment
privilege. The same sort of conflict between the right to remain silent
and the bankruptcy process also may arise in connection with such
other matters as a Chapter 7 trustee's response to a motion to remove
the trustee's or an objection to a creditor's proof of claim.19
As the number of bankruptcy cases filed in the United States con-
tinues to hover near the one-million-a-year mark, simple statistics
suggest that the number of persons involved in the bankruptcy pro-
cess with potential criminal problems will increase. These bankrupt
individuals and third parties who bring a history of questionable con-
duct into bankruptcy proceedings not only must contend with credi-
6. By contrast, "[tihe former Bankruptcy Act provided that '[no] testimony given by
[a debtor] shall be offered in evidence against [a debtor] in any criminal proceed-
ing." In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1988)(quoting Glickstein v. United
States, 222 U.S. 139, 140-41 (1911)).
7. Id.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1994); FED. R. BA xR. P. 1007.
9. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (1994); FED. R. BAxa. P. 2003.
10. See FED. R. BAiemL P. 2004-2005.
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994); FED. R. BANHI. P. 4007.
12. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141 (1994); FED. R. BA-KR. P. 4004.
13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1225, 1325 (1994); FED. R. BAxx. P. 3020.
14. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(8), 1106(a)(1), 1107(a), 1203, 1304(c) (1994); FED. R. BANKE.
P. 2015.
15. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(a), 1112, 1208, 1307 (1994); FD. R. BANKR P. 1017, 1019.
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994); FED. R. BAca. P. 2007.1.
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 1204 (1994).
18. See id. § 324.
19. See id. §§ 501-502; FED. R. BANxR. P. 3001-3005, 3007.
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tors and bankruptcy trustees who might pursue civil remedies against
them, they also likely have to contend with the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, which has stepped up its efforts to combat criminal
bankruptcy fraud.20 Under the circumstances, bankruptcy practition-
ers are well-advised to become more familiar with the nuances of the
Fifth Amendment.
To assist them in this regard, this Article discusses both the man-
ner in which issues regarding the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination may arise in bankruptcy cases and the many poten-
tial consequences of asserting the privilege. Parts II and III provide a
general overview of the bankruptcy process and the Fifth Amendment,
respectively. Part IV examines whether and to what extent the privi-
lege against self-incrimination protects corporations and their direc-
tors, officers, and shareholders. Part V offers a similar examination of
the extent to which the Fifth Amendment protects against the com-
pelled production of documents. Parts VI and VII address the closely
related topics of invocation and waiver of the privilege. Part VIII ana-
lyzes what may well be the most serious potential consequence of in-
voking the privilege-the court's drawing an adverse inference
against the individual choosing to remain silent. Part IX analyzes
other, at least arguably, less serious potential consequences when the
court draws such inferences. Part X discusses the question of whether
a bankruptcy court can and should stay bankruptcy proceedings pend-
ing the outcome of criminal proceedings against an individual who in-
vokes the privilege against self-incrimination during a bankruptcy
proceeding. Finally, Part XI deals with immunity, an often suggested
but seldom granted means of resolving the inherent conflict between
the individual's right to remain silent and other parties' interests in
full disclosure.
II. OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
The dramatic increase in the number of bankruptcy filings over the
past ten years has correspondingly produced an increase in the
number of attorneys who represent clients in bankruptcy cases. Par-
ticipants in the bankruptcy process thus may range in experience
from recent law school graduates and sole practitioners who have had
limited contact with the bankruptcy system to bankruptcy specialists
who devote most, if not all, of their time to the practice. This Part
serves as both an introduction to bankruptcy law for less experienced
practitioners and a refresher course on the historical purpose and cur-
20. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Operation Total Disclosure: A Commentary on the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Prosecution of Bankruptcy Crimes, 15 Am.
BANKR. INST. J. 10 (1996).
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rent operation of the American bankruptcy system for more seasoned
attorneys.
To better understand the controversies created when an individual
participating in the bankruptcy process asserts the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, it is helpful to comprehend the
historical origins of the federal bankruptcy power, its limits and
breadth, and the manner in which it is currently exercised under Title
11 of the United States Code.
The various American bankruptcy systems that have been created
by Congress over the past two centuries are the products of two dis-
tinct provisions of the United States Constitution. Article I grants
Congress the express authority to create courts inferior to the United
States Supreme Court.21 Article I also confers the power to establish
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. 2 2 Beginning in 1800,
Congress has exercised these powers to create five successive systems
of bankruptcy laws: the Bankruptcy Act of 1800;23 the Bankruptcy
Act of 1841;24 the Bankruptcy Act of 1867;25 the Bankruptcy Act of
1898;26 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,27 which created the
current bankruptcy system.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution empowers Con-
gress to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, but provides
no definition for the concept of "bankruptcy." To understand the
boundaries of the bankruptcy power, it is therefore necessary to ap-
preciate the historical nature and development of bankruptcy law.28
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
23. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6,
2 Stat. 248.
24. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of March 3, 1843, ch.
82, 5 Stat. 614.
25. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June 22, 1874,
ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 170, 20 Stat. 99.
26. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Nelson Act), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler
Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The Act of 1898 was used largely for personal
and business liquidations and business reorganizations. Personal reorganiza-
tions were uncommon.
27. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended by
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, and amended by Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
28. See generally Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA.
L. REv. 223 (1919). See also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & ThoAtAs H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANxRuprcY 20-30 (1985); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD &
THoims H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRuPTCY 26-37
(2d ed. 1990)[hereinafter BMD & JACKSON II]; ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLi D.
WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 17-20 (1985); CHARLEs WAMEN, BANxRuprcY IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY (1935); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 169-74 (1986).
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To the extent that bankruptcy is considered simply a process
whereby a person is released from her debts, its genesis can be traced
to Biblical times. While the concept of discharging the downtrodden
from their debts may have Judeo-Christian origins, it was given seri-
ous sanction in civil law2 9 by the Romans. During the reign of Julius
Caesar, the Romans enacted a law called "Cessio Bonorum," or "the
law relating to assignments for the benefit of creditors."3 O The term
"bankruptcy" descends from statutes of fourteenth century Italian
city-states known as "banca rupta," a term that referred to a "medie-
val custom of breaking the bench of a banker or tradesman who ab-
sconded with property of his creitors."3 1
Yet, as is the case with much of America's constitutional jurispru-
dence, the origins of the Bankruptcy Clause can be traced to English
law.3 2 The first English bankruptcy laws, enacted in 1542 during the
reign of King Henry VIII, were quasicriminal in nature.3 3 The Stat-
ute of Bankrupts, enacted during the reign of Queen Elizabeth in
1570, applied only to merchants and was punitive in nature.3 4 Eng-
lish bankruptcy laws became more humane as time passed. The first
law granting a debtor a discharge of debts owing at the time of filing,
with certain conditions, was enacted during the rule of Queen Anne in
the eighteenth century.3 5
29. As used here, the term civil law refers to statutes created by the political sover-
eign, as opposed to laws established by divine edict.
30. 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANmKuFrcY LAW OF THE UNrrED
STATES § 1, at 5 (J. Henderson ed., 5th ed. 1950).
31. BAirD & JACKSON II, supra note 28, at 27 (citing Israel Treiman, Acts of Bank-
ruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modem Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 189
(1938-39)). See also JoRDA & WARREN, supra note 28, at 17 (explaining the ori-
gin of the term bankruptcy).
32. See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BANER. INST. L. REv. 5 (1995); Israel Tremain, Escaping the
Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 LAw Q. 230 (1927)(explaining the origins of Eng-
lish bankruptcy law).
33. Tabb, supra note 32, at 7 (citing 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4 (1542-43)(Eng.)). See also
Levinthal, supra note 28, at 16-18.
34. JoAN & WARREN, supra note 28, at 18 (citing 12 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570)(Eng)).
35. Id. at 19 (citing the Statutes of Anne, 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705)(Eng.), and 10 Anne,
ch. 15 (1711)(Eng.)). One commentator explains the origins of the English dis-
charge as follows:
The discharge was the result of the gradual realization of the fact that in
many cases the bankrupt might be properly an object of pity, and that
the unlimited incarceration of the debtor did not tend to reimburse the
creditors at all. The case was first strongly put in a certain Declaration
and Appeal drawn up in 1645 and signed by a hundred debtors confined
in the Fleet. They were the spokesmen of a large number of persons, as
they estimated that there were 8000 debtors thus confined through Eng-
land and Wales, who urged that the treatment to which they were sub-
jected was unconstitutional. In 1648, when prices were very high, the
sufferings of the prisoners were notoriously severe. It was not until Sep-
tember and December, 1649, that acts were passed providing for the dis-
[Vol. 76:497
1997] FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE IN BANKRUPTCY 503
The subject of bankruptcy law was discussed only briefly at the
Constitutional Convention that met in Philadelphia during the sum-
mer of 1787. The Convention was convened to revise the Articles of
Confederation, but instead produced the current United States Con-
stitution.36 The topic, however, did come up later.
On August 29, 1787, Charles Pinkney proposed adding the follow-
ing clause to the new constitution: "to establish uniform laws upon
the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages arising on the
protest of foreign bills of exchange."3 7 Pinkney's suggestion was re-
ferred to a subcommittee, 38 which issued a favorable report on the rec-
ommendation just three days later.3 9 The proposed bankruptcy clause
was briefly debated by the Convention on Monday, September 3, 1787,
and then approved by an overwhelming majority.4 0
Few voices were raised in opposition to the Bankruptcy Clause.4 1
One person expressed fear that the states would be prohibited from
charge of poor persons unable to pay their creditors; prisoners whose
possessions were not worth more than five pounds, besides their clothes
and tools, were to take an oath to that effect before justices, and after
due notice was served on the creditors, the prisoners were to be
discharged.
The Acts of Anne provided that honest insolvents should be granted
their discharge if they complied with the requirements of the law. This
provision was probably the consequence not only of pity, but also of the
feeling that mercantile credit is given in the interest of the creditor as
well as of the debtor; that the giving of credit necessarily involves some
risk; that it should be the business of the trader to insure against this
loss by adding a percentage for the credit which he advances; and that
all the debtor ought to pledge is his estate, not his future earnings, and
certainly not his personal liberty.
Levinthal, supra note 28, at 18-19. See also Jay Cohen, The History of Imprison-
ment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3
J. LEGAL HIST. 153 (1982).
36. James Madison recorded the events and debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion. See 1 JAMEs MADISON, THE JOURNAL OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
WIRCH FRAMIED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 13-19 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1908). The Virginia Plan, which was written primarily by James Madison, is
often referred to as the "Large States' Plan." The South Carolina Plan is known
as the "Small States' Plan." The proposal for a new constitution offered by Alex-
ander Hamilton would have implicitly given Congress the power to enact bank-
ruptcy laws if it deemed them necessary. Id. at 172. Article VII of the Hamilton
Plan suggested that "[tihe Legislature of the United States shall have power to
pass all laws which they shall judge necessary to the common defence and gen-
eral welfare of the Union." Id.
37. 2 id. at 267.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 292.
40. Nine states voted for the clause-Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Virginia. Only Connecticut voted against it. Id. at 294.
41. The only widely read Anti-Federalist who discussed the subject at length, "the
Federalist Farmer," vacillated on the issue. In some letters, the Farmer seemed
to support the concept of a bankruptcy clause. See 2 THE CoNiPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
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passing debt relief laws because the Bankruptcy Clause arguably
could be interpreted as granting to the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction in this area.42 This did not prove to be the case, however,
as states were and are free to legislate in the area of debt relief so long
as their efforts do not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.
In exercising the power granted to it by the Bankruptcy Clause,
Congress has steadily distanced American bankruptcy law from its
historical roots in criminal proceedings. In the process, bankruptcy
ALIST 229-30 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)(1787-1788)(Letters from the Federal
Farmer, October 8, 1787). For example, in one such letter, he provided the follow-
ing explanation:
I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal police of all
the states to discern fully, how general bankrupt laws, made by the
union, would effect them, or promote the public good. I believe the prop-
erty of debtors, in the several states, is held responsible for their debts in
modes and forms very different. If uniform bankrupt laws can be made
without producing real and substantial inconveniences, I wish them to
be made by congress.
Id. In contrast, in a letter written on January 25, 1788, the Farmer expressed a
different opinion on the subject:
[ift does not appear to me, on further reflection, that the union ought to
have the power, it does not appear to me to be a power properly inciden-
tal to a federal head, and, I believe, no one ever possessed it; it is a power
that will immediately and extensively interfere with the internal police
of the separate states, especially with their administering justice among
their citizens. By giving this power to the union, we greatly expand the
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, as all questions arising on bankrupt
laws, being laws of the union, even between citizens of the same state,
may be tried in the federal courts; and I think it may be shewn, that by
the help of these laws, actions between citizens of different states, and
the laws of the federal city, aided by no overstrained judicial fictions,
almost all civil causes may be drawn into those courts.
Id. at 344.
42. The Anti-Federalist "Deliberator" warned that "[n]o state can given [sic] relief to
insolvent debtors, however distressing their situation may be; since Congress will
have the exclusive right of establishing uniform laws on the subject of bankrupt-
cies throughout the United States." 3 id. at 180. The Federal Farmer raised the
same concern.
By article I, section 8, congress shall have power to establish uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States. It is
to be observed, that the separate states have ever been in possession of
the power, and in the use of it, of making bankrupt laws .... [N]o words
are used by the constitution to exclude the jurisdiction of the several
states, and whether they will be excluded or not, or whether they and
the union will have concurrent jurisdiction or not, must be determined
by inference; and from the nature of the subject; if the power, for in-
stance, to make uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, is in its
nature indivisible, or incapable of being exercised by two legislatures in-
dependently, or by one in aid of the other, then the states are excluded,
and cannot legislate at all on the subject, even though the union should
neglect or find it impracticable to establish uniform bankrupt laws. How
far the union will find it practicable to do this, time only can fully
determine.
2 id. at 343-44 (Letters from the Federal Farmer, January 25, 1787).
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has evolved into an equitable proceeding4 3 that is much more debtor-
friendly than its predecessors.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Bankruptcy Act), as amended,
was the first modern bankruptcy law. It remained in effect for more
than eighty years, longer than any other bankruptcy law in the United
States. Under the Bankruptcy Act, liquidation and reorganization
took place in the federal district court under the direction and supervi-
sion of bankruptcy referees. After the United States endured numer-
ous periods of economic change, the Bankruptcy Act became the
subject of increased debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s.4 4 The
Bankruptcy Act finally was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, which enacted the current Bankruptcy Code.4 5 As amended, the
Bankruptcy Code remains the law of the land, although federal courts
43. After almost 100 years of drawing a distinction between courts of bankruptcy and
courts of equity, the United States Supreme Court first referred to the bank-
ruptcy court as a "court of equity" in Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881). In
explaining the power conferred upon the bankruptcy court, Justice Woods stated
in dicta that
in cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of
administering the bankruptcy estate, which would ordinarily be pure
cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belong-
ing to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the
bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive
control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankruptcy is in-
vestigated by chancery methods. The bankruptcy court may, and in
cases peculiarly requiring such a course will, direct an action or an issue
at law to aid it in arriving at a right conclusion. But this rests in its
sound discretion.
Id. at 134. But, in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), the Supreme Court,
while conceding that some of its early decisions had described bankruptcy pro-
ceedings as inherently equitable in nature, emphasized that § 1 and § 2 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 invested the bankruptcy court "with such jurisdiction at
law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bank-
ruptcy proceedings." Id. at 304. Even though many, if not most, issues decided
by bankruptcy judges involve statutory interpretation, the perception of bank-
ruptcy courts as courts of equity persists.
44. In the late 1960s, the Brookings Institute conducted an important study of the
bankruptcy system, the results of which were published in 1971. DAvm T. STAN-
L=y & MmwoRm GmTH, BANiRUPTcv- PROBLEM, PROCEss, REFORMI (Brookings
Inst. 1971).
45. Subsequent references to the "Bankruptcy Code" or "Code" refer to the 1978 Act.
The original reform bill was introduced by the Commission to the 93d Congress,
as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565. The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges dis-
agreed with many of the proposed provisions and, in response, drafted its own
alternative Act. Both bills were then introduced in the 94th Congress, and after
extensive hearings, a synthesis bill was drafted and introduced in the 95th Con-
gress. In 1978, the bill, S. 2266, was passed in the form of an Amendment to H.R.
8200. After both the Senate and House passed additional amendments, H.R.
8200 was finally passed by the Senate on October 5, 1978, and by the House on
October 6, 1978. The new Act become applicable to all cases filed after October 1,
1979. Martin I. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 Am. BANKEL L.J. 3
(1979).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
still rely on principles developed under the Bankruptcy Act to inter-
pret parallel provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.46
The Bankruptcy Code originally provided four distinct forms of re-
lief: Chapter 7 (liquidation);4 7 Chapter 9 (adjustment of debts of a
municipality);4 8 Chapter 11 (reorganization);4 9 and Chapter 13 (ad-
justment of debts of an individual with regular income).50 In 1986,
the Code was amended to provide a fifth form of relief, Chapter 12
(adjustment of debts of a family farmer with regular annual
income).5 1
Structurally, the Bankruptcy Code is divided into eight chapters.
The first three Chapters (1, 3, and 5) are procedural. Each of the re-
maining five Chapters (7, 9, 11, 12, and 13) provides for and governs
one of the forms of relief mentioned above. Chapter 152 includes defi-
nitions, rules of construction, and other general provisions that are
applicable to cases filed under any of the relief chapters. 5 3 Chapters
354 and 555 contain various provisions governing case administration,
creditors, debtors, and the estate, which apply to cases filed under
Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13.56
Every bankruptcy case begins with the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion.5 7 Depending upon the circumstances and the chapter under
which the petition is filed, a petition may be either voluntary or invol-
untary,S8 and individual or joint.59 The debtor must be eligible for
46. In Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 553
(1990), the United States Supreme Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code should
not be read to "erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Con-
gress intended such a departure." While the Court left open the question of what
constitutes such a "clear indication" of congressional intent, Davenport can be
read as standing for the general proposition that some principles that evolved
under the Bankruptcy Act retain their validity under the Bankruptcy Code. As a
result, a practitioner with some understanding of the Bankruptcy Act may be
able to use these principles to advance her client's cause in a case under the
Bankruptcy Code.
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994).
48. Id. §§ 901-946.
49. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
50. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
51. Id. §§ 1201-1231.
52. Id. §§ 101-110.
53. Id. § 103(a), (e).
54. Id. §§ 301-366.
55. Id. §§ 501-560.
56. Id. § 103(a).
57. See id. § 301. A petition seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code is a formal
request for protection and the commencement of the bankruptcy case. A filing
fee, which varies in amount depending upon the chapter under which the petition
is filed, must accompany the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (1994).
58. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1994). A voluntary petition is filed by the debtor. An
involuntary petition is filed by one or more of the debtor's creditors, or if the
debtor is a partnership, by fewer than all of the debtor's general partners. Id.
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relief under the chapter under which the petition is filed.60 Upon the
filing of a petition for relief, two significant events instantly transpire
as a matter of law-an "estate" is created, 6 1 and an "automatic stay"
goes into effect.62
The bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."63 The
estate also includes the debtor's and the debtor's spouse's interests in
certain community property; property the trustee recovers on behalf of
the estate; certain property preserved for the estate or ordered trans-
ferred to the estate; property acquired by the debtor within 180 days
after the filing of the petition by bequest, devise, or inheritance, pur-
suant to a property settlement or divorce decree, or as beneficiary of a
life insurance policy or death benefit plan; proceeds, product, off-
spring, rents, and profits from property of the estate; and any property
§ 303(b). If the debtor has fewer than 12 creditors, a single creditor with a claim
totaling $10,000 may file the involuntary petition. Id. § 303(b)(2). If the debtor
has 12 or more creditors, three or more creditors with claims totaling $10,000
must file the involuntary petition. Id. § 303(b)(1). An involuntary petition may
be filed only under Chapters 7 and 11 against a debtor that is not a farmer, fam-
ily farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corpo-
ration. Id. § 303(a).
59. See id. § 302. Ajoint petition is a single petition filed by an individual debtor and
her spouse.
60. See id. § 109. Any "person" that is not a railroad, an insurance company, or a
proscribed financial institution may be a Chapter 7 debtor. Id. § 109(b). For the
purposes of determining eligibility to file a bankrtptcy petition, "person7 includes
individuals, partnerships, and corporations, but not governmental units. See id.
§ 101(41). Only a municipality that is insolvent and that is permitted under state
law to proceed under Chapter 9 may be a Chapter 9 debtor. Id. § 109(c). Any
person who is eligible for relief under Chapter 7, other than a stockbroker or a
commodity broker, may be a Chapter 11 debtor. Id. § 109(d). In addition, rail-
roads may be Chapter 11 debtors. Id. Only a "family farmer" with regular an-
nual income may be a Chapter 12 debtor. Id. § 109(f). A "family farmer" is an
individual whose debts do not exceed $1,500,000, at least 80% of whose debts
arose from the farming operation, and more than 50% of whose gross income in
the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the Chapter 12 petition was
filed derived from farming, or a corporation or partnership that meets a similar,
but separate, set of requirements. Id. § 101(18). Only an individual with regular
income who has noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debt of less than $250,000,
and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debt of less than $750,000 may be a Chap-
ter 13 debtor. Id. § 109(e). Finally, no one who was a debtor in a case pending at
any time in the 180 preceding days may be a debtor under any chapter, if the
prior case was dismissed because of the debtor's willful failure to abide by an
order of the court or pursuant to the debtor's request following the filing of a
motion for relief from the automatic stay. Id. § 109(g).
61. Id. § 541(a).
62. Id. § 362(a).
63. Id. § 541(a)(1). In essence, with only limited exceptions, the estate steps into the
debtor's shoes with respect to any property, whether tangible or intangible, in
which the debtor had any interest, whether legal or equitable, on the date the
petition was filed. See id. § 541(a)(6), (b)(1)-(5), (c)(2).
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that the estate acquires after the filing of the petition.6 4 The debtor is
permitted to "exempt" certain property, which has the effect of remov-
ing that property from the estate. 65
In Chapter 7 cases, a trustee is appointed to take possession and
serve as the representative of the estate.6 6 In Chapter 11, 12, and 13
cases, the debtor ordinarily remains in possession of the estate and is
responsible for its administration.6 7 Under certain circumstances,
however, the bankruptcy court may order the removal of a Chapter 11
or 12 "debtor in possession" and appoint a trustee to take possession of
and assume the responsibility for administering the estate. 68 Upon
the dismissal of a case or confirmation of a Chapter 11, 12, or 13 plan
of reorganization, property of the estate ordinarily revests in the
debtor.69
The second significant event that occurs upon the filing of a peti-
tion for relief is the imposition of the automatic stay, a form of injunc-
tive relief that prohibits creditors from taking certain actions against
the debtor or the property of the estate.70 The automatic stay does
not, however, enjoin all actions against the debtor. For example, it
does not prevent the government from commencing or continuing
criminal proceedings against the debtor.71
The purpose of the automatic stay is to maintain the status quo. In
reorganization cases, the stay permits the debtor to put together a
plan of reorganization without having to deal with demand letters,
lawsuits, and other collection efforts. In Chapter 7 cases, the stay al-
lows the trustee to identify, collect, and liquidate the property of the
estate without interference from creditors trying to enforce their judg-
ments and liens.
64. See id. § 541(a)(2)-(7).
65. See id. § 522(b). Unless the state in which the debtor is domiciled has "opted out"
of the federal exemptions, see id. § 522(b)(1), the debtor may claim either the fed-
eral exemptions listed in § 522(d), or the exemptions provided under other federal
law and the law of the state in which she is domiciled. See id. § 522(b). Typically,
exempt property includes the basic necessities of life, which are considered essen-
tial to the debtor's "fresh start."
66. See id. §§ 323, 701-704.
67. See id. §§ 1107, 1203, 1303-1304.
68. See id. §§ 1104, 1204. Among the grounds for such relief are fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, and gross mismanagement.
69. See id. §§ 349(b)(3), 1141(b), 1227(b), 1327(b).
70. See id. § 362(a). Among the prohibited actions are commencing or continuing ju-
dicial proceedings against the debtor; enforcing prepetition judgments against
the debtor; creating, perfecting, or enforcing liens against property of the estate;
and attempting to collect prepetition claims against the debtor.
71. See id. § 362(b)(1). Other actions that are not stayed include commencing or con-
tinuing paternity proceedings; collecting alimony, maintenance, or support from
property that is not property of the estate; and commencing or continuing pro-
ceedings to enforce a governmental unit's police or regulatory power. See id.
§ 362(b)(2)-(18).
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Regardless of the chapter under which the petition is filed, the au-
tomatic stay remains in effect with respect to actions against property
of the estate until the property is no longer property of the estate.
72
The stay remains in effect with respect to any other action until the
case is closed or dismissed or the debtor is granted a discharge, which-
ever occurs first.73 A creditor may seek relief from the stay for cause,
including a lack of adequate protection of the creditor's interests.7 4
As discussed above, there are five different forms of bankruptcy
relief, ranging from liquidation of a debtor's assets to reorganization of
his debts. Each of these forms of relief offers protection, assistance,
and opportunity for a "fresh start" for the debtor.
Chapter 7 is the most prevalent form of bankruptcy relief sought
today. In a Chapter 7 case, the United States Trustee75 appoints an
interim trustee to serve as the representative of the estate until the
meeting of creditors7 6 is held. Creditors attending the meeting of
creditors may elect their own trustee.7 7 If they do not, the interim
trustee serves as the trustee in the case. 78 The trustee is responsible
for, among other things, collecting and liquidating the debtor's nonex-
empt assets. 7 9 In return for surrendering these nonexempt assets, the
court will grant the debtor a discharge of his debts.80 Yet, under cer-
tain circumstances, the bankruptcy court may deny the debtor a dis-
charges' or find that a particular debt is nondischargeable.8 2 If the
72. Id. § 362(c)(1). Property of the estate would cease to be property of the estate, for
example, if it was claimed exempt, see id. § 522(b), if it was abandoned, see id.
§ 554, or if it was sold, see id. § 363(b).
73. Id. § 362(c)(2).
74. See id. § 362(d).
75. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589a (1994). The United States Trustee System, which is
part of the Department of Justice, was created to supervise the administration of
bankruptcy cases. This is accomplished, in part, through the appointment and
supervision of bankruptcy trustees.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (1994). The debtor is required to attend the meeting ofcredi-
tors and submit to an examination under oath. Id. § 343. Creditors may attend
and ask the debtor questions regarding her financial affairs. Id.
77. Id. § 702.
78. Id. § 702(d).
79. Id. § 704.
80. See id. § 727.
81. See id. § 727(a)(1)-(10). A debtor may be denied a discharge, for example, if he
conceals property or records; knowingly and fraudulently gives a false oath or
account; fails to explain a loss of assets; or refuses to obey a lawful order of the
court. A complaint objecting to discharge must be filed within 60 days of the first
date set for the meeting of creditors. FED. R. BAaNP. P. 4004(a). The court may
extend this deadline, but the motion for such an extension must be filed before
the deadline passes. Id. 4004(b).
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)-(c) (1994). Section 523 lists 18 types of debts that are not
discharged, including certain taxes; debts omitted from the debtor's schedules;
debts for alimony, maintenance, or support; debts for certain student loans; and
debts for death or personal injury that results from driving while intoxicated. A
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debtor receives a discharge, she is not eligible to receive another
Chapter 7 discharge for six years.8 3
Considered in the context of the history of bankruptcy discussed
above, Chapter 9 is a relatively recent phenomenon, having its roots in
the Municipal Bankruptcy Act,84 which was a product of the Great
Depression. Chapter 9 was relatively unused until the late 1980s
when certain changes transformed municipal bankruptcy law into an
effective way for a public entity to seek protection from its creditors
while negotiating and formulating a plan of debt adjustment. Chapter
9 is largely patterned after the reorganization provisions of Chapter
11.85 The mandate of the Tenth Amendment, however, limits the
bankruptcy court's involvement in the administration of a Chapter 9
case or in the operation of the municipal entity, as compared to the
court's involvement in cases filed under the other relief chapters.S6 As
noted above, only a municipality8 7 may seek Chapter 9 relief.88 A
Chapter 9 plan might include provisions to extend maturities, reduce
interest or principal, or obtain a new loan from another source to pay
off prefiling debts.89
Chapter 11 relief is available to individuals, partnerships, and cor-
porations that wish to preserve, protect, and reorganize a financially
distressed business. Reorganization under Chapter 11 allows a debtor
to continue to operate its business while restructuring its prepetition
debts by paying a portion of such debts and discharging the balance.
complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt must be brought within 60
days of the first date set for the meeting of creditors if the debt is incurred by
false pretenses, false representations, actual fraud, or use of a false financial
statement; a debt for fiduciary fraud or defalcation, embezzlement, or larceny; a
debt for willful and malicious injury; or a debt incurred in connection with a di-
vorce or separation for anything other than for alimony, maintenance, and sup-
port, e.g., a property settlement. FED. R. BAim. P. 4007(c). The court may also
extend this deadline, but the motion for the extension must be filed before the
deadline passes. Id. Other complaints to determine the dischargeability of debts
may be brought at any time. Id. 4007(b).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (1994).
84. Municipal Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934). The Municipal
Bankruptcy Act was intended to amend an act known as "An Act to Establish a
Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States," as approved July
1, 1898. Id.
85. Many of the Bankruptcy Code provisions concerning Chapter 11 reorganizations,
such as the content of the plan, classification of claims, acceptance of the plan,
and confirmation of the plan, apply to Chapter 9 municipal reorganizations. 11
U.S.C. § 901(a) (1994). See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 263 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5963,
6221. For example, the court has no power to control expenditures for municipal
services or any other activities of the municipal entity. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1994).
87. Municipality is defined as a "political subdivision or public agency or instrumen-
tality of a State." 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1994).
88. Id. § 109(c)(1).
89. 6 LAWRENCE KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 900.01[1] (15th ed. rev. 1996).
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Chapter 11 reorganization cases can be very complex and time-con-
suming, which makes Chapter 11 relief more expensive than the other
forms of bankruptcy relief. In return for being permitted to remain in
possession of its property and control of its business operation, a
Chapter 11 debtor is considered a "debtor in possession" and must ful-
fill certain statutory duties of a trustee.9 0 The bankruptcy court may,
for cause, order the appointment of a trustee.91 The court may also
order that the case be converted to another chapter or be dismissed.92
During the first 120 days following the filing of a Chapter 11 peti-
tion, only the debtor may file a plan of reorganization.9 3 A plan must
include certain provisions and may include others, including "any
other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provi-
sions of [the Bankruptcy Code]."94 Creditors are given the opportu-
nity to accept or reject the plan based upon their reading of the plan
and a court-approved "disclosure statement," which must accompany
the plan.9 5 The bankruptcy court must then determine whether the
plan should be confirmed.9 6 The plan may be modified either before or
after confirmation.9 7 An order confirming a Chapter 11 plan of reor-
ganization binds all parties, including those creditors who rejected it,
and discharges the debtor's remaining debt.9s
A Chapter 12 reorganization is available only to a "family
farmer"99 and is designed to proceed on an expedited basis. The
debtor who, like a Chapter 11 debtor, acts as a "debtor in posses-
sion,"10 0 must file a plan within ninety days of the filing of his peti-
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994).
91. Id. § 1104(a)(1).
92. Id. § 1112.
93. Id. § 1121(b). If the debtor does not file a plan within the "exclusivity period," any
party in interest may then file a plan. See id. § 1121(c)(2).
94. Id. § 1123(a), (b)(6).
95. See id. § 1125(b). The disclosure statement must include "information of a kind,
and in sufficient detail... that would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor
typical of holders of claims... to make an informed judgment about the plan."
Id. § 1125(a)(1).
96. See id. § 1128. With one exception, the court may confirm a plan only if each of
the requirements set forth in § 1129(a) is met. See id. § 1129(b)(1). If one or
more classes of impaired claims does not accept the plan, the court may neverthe-
less confirm (or "cram down") the plan if it does not "discriminate unfairly and is
fair and equitable" with respect to each such dissenting class. Id. What is "fair
and equitable" is determined by § 1129(b)(2), the statutory embodiment of the
"absolute priority rule."
97. Id. § 1127(a)-(b).
98. Id. § 1141(a), (d)(1)(A). This procedure differs from those in Chapters 12 and 13,
in which the discharge is not granted until the debtor has completed her plan
payments. See id. §§ 1228(a), 1328(a).
99. Id. § 109(f). See generally id. § 101(18) (defining "family farmer").
100. Compare id. § 1107(a) (setting forth the rights, powers, and duties of a debtor in
possession under Chapter 11), with id. § 1203 (setting forth the rights and pow-
ers of a debtor under Chapter 12).
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tion,101 and the confirmation hearing must be concluded within forty-
five days of the filing of the plan.1 0 2 Thus, absent an extension, a
debtor's plan should be confirmed within 135 days of the filing of the
debtor's petition.
A Chapter 12 plan must provide that the debtor will submit future
income to the supervision and control of the Chapter 12 trustee 0 3 to
fund the plan; priority claims will be paid in full;104 and each claim
within a class of claims will receive the same treatment.-0 5 A Chapter
12 plan may include a number of other provisions, again including
"any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable
provisions of [the Bankruptcy Codel."106 Such a plan "may not pro-
vide for payments over a period that is longer than three years, unless
the court for cause approves a longer period, [up to] five years."' 0 7
While creditors do not vote on a Chapter 12 plan, they may object
to its confirmation.10 8 If the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects,
the court may not confirm a Chapter 12 plan unless the unsecured
creditors will be paid in full or the debtor offers all of her "disposable
income"1 0 9 to make payments under the plan for three years.110 Un-
less the plan or the order confirming the plan provides otherwise, the
debtor continues to operate the farm during the life of the plan,"' and
the trustee makes the payments to creditors under the plan.112
As is the case with respect to Chapter 11 plans, a Chapter 12 plan
may be modified either before or after confirmation.11 3 Upon comple-
tion of all plan payments, a Chapter 12 debtor is eligible for
discharge.1 14
101. Id. § 1221. The 90-day period may be extended "if the need for an extension is
attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held ac-
countable." Id.
102. Id. § 1224. The 45-day period may be extended for cause. Id.
103. Id. § 1222(a)(1). See generally id. § 1202(b) (setting forth the duties of the
trustee).
104. Id. § 1222(a)(2). See generally id. § 507 (setting forth the priority of expenses and
claims).
105. Id. § 1222(a)(3).
106. Id. § 1222(b)(11).
107. Id. § 1222(c).
108. See id. § 1224.
109. See generally id. § 1225(b)(2) (defining "disposable income").
110. Id. § 1225(b)(1).
111. See id. § 1227(b).
112. Id. § 1226(c). For her services, the trustee receives a percentage fee, set by the
Attorney General of the United States, which the trustee collects from the pay-
ments she receives from the debtor. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1)(B) (1994).
113. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1223, 1229.
114. Id. § 1228(a). If the debtor is unable to complete her plan payments "due to cir-
cumstances for which [she] should not justly be held accountable," the court may
grant her a "hardship discharge." Id. § 1228(b).
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While the eligibility requirements differ, Chapter 13 is very simi-
lar to Chapter 12. A Chapter 13 debtor, like a Chapter 12 debtor, pro-
poses a plan1 5 and makes payments to a trustee,116 and the
trustee 1 7 in turn makes payments to the debtor's creditors pursuant
to that plan," 5-8 which may be modified either before or after confirma-
tion.1 19 Chapter 13 creditors also have much in common with their
Chapter 12 counterparts, including the right to object to confirmation
of the debtor's plan,120 and the right to insist that the debtor either
pay all unsecured claims in full or offer his "disposable income"12 1 for
the same three-year period provided for in Chapter 12.122
The two chapters are not identical, however. For example, a Chap-
ter 13 reorganization lacks the same "fast track" as a Chapter 12 reor-
ganization. While a Chapter 13 debtor has only fifteen days from the
filing of his petition within which to timely file a plan,123 Chapter 13
provides no specific time frame within which that plan must be con-
firmed. A Chapter 13 case may thus have a longer life than a Chapter
12 case. Another difference is that despite remaining in possession of
the property of the estate, a Chapter 13 debtor has fewer duties im-
posed on her than a Chapter 11 or Chapter 12 debtor in possession.12 4
A final example of the differences between the two chapters is that a
Chapter 13 discharge is considerably broader in scope than a Chapter
12 discharge. 125
Regardless of the chapter under which it is filed, a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding can be extremely complicated. The process requires a judge
presiding over a bankruptcy case to balance the needs of the debtor
against the competing and often conflicting interests of her creditors,
using the statutory guidelines of the Bankruptcy Code as the fulcrum.
To assist courts, debtors, creditors, and other interested parties in de-
termining precisely what those needs and interests might be in a
given case, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require debt-
ors to make a full disclosure of a wide variety of information. "[T]he
debtor... shall file schedules of assets and liabilities, a schedule of
current income and expenditures, a schedule of executory contracts
115. Id. §§ 1321, 1322. Cf. id. § 1222.
116. Id. §§ 1326. Cf. id. § 1226.
117. See generally id. § 1302.
118. Id. § 1326(c). Cf id. § 1226(c).
119. Id. §§ 1323, 1329. Cf id. §§ 1223, 1229.
120. See id. § 1324.
121. See id. § 1325(b)(2).
122. Id. § 1325(b)(1). Cf id. § 1225(b)(1).
123. See FED. R. BANK. P. 3015(b).
124. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1303-1304 (1994). Cf id. §§ 1107, 1203.
125. See id. § 1328. Cf id. § 1228. For example, certain taxes that are not dischargea-
ble in Chapter 12 are dischargeable in Chapter 13. A Chapter 13 discharge is
also broader in scope than a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 discharge. Cf id. §§ 727,
1141(d).
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and unexpired leases, and a statement of financial affairs, prepared as
prescribed by the appropriate Official Forms."1 2 6 This information
must be verified by the debtor to be true, accurate, and complete. 127
In situations in which a debtor is suspected of a white-collar crime
involving property of the estate, or in which the debtor's records could
help establish a criminal case against him, the full disclosure require-
ments of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules may well be in direct conflict
with the debtor's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In such a
situation, the debtor may have to decide whether earning the bank-
ruptcy discharge is more important than avoiding the possibility of
being convicted of a crime. The scope of the privilege against self-in-
crimination is discussed below.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The United States Constitution initially did not include any prohi-
bition against compelling a defendant to incriminate himself.128 A
mere four days after President Washington was inaugurated, how-
ever, Congressman James Madison of Virginia submitted such a pro-
viso to the first House of Representatives as part of the Bill of Rights,
in which Madison recommended the initial amendments to the Consti-
tution.12 9 Though Madison, as one of the anonymous coauthors of the
Federalist Papers, originally resisted adding a Bill of Rights to the
Constitution,ao he eventually changed his mind. As he reassessed
126. FED. R. BANER. P. 1007(b). See also id. 9009 (Forms); Official Form No. 6 (Sched-
ules); Official Form No. 7 (Statement of Financial Affairs).
127. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008.
128. CATHERINE D. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTTU-
TIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER, 1787 (1966); IRVING DILLIAP, BUnILDIG
THE CONSTTUTmN (50th anniv. ed. 1987)(reprinted from the St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch); CARL VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL: THE STORY OF THE MAKING AND
RATIFYING OF THE CONSTITTON OF THE UNITED STATES (1948); JAMES MADISON,
NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1984)(1840); CLINTON RossrrER,
1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966).
129. RALPH KEToHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 289 (1971). For further discus-
sion of the legislative history of the Bill of Rights, see CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DocuMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS (Helen
E. Veit et al. eds., 1991)(tracing the political movement that led to the adoption of
the first 10 amendments from its origins to its eventual success).
130. See generally VAN DOREN, TIE FEDERALIST, OR THE NEW CONsTrrUTION (Papers by
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay)(1945). The Federalist Pa-
pers is a series of essays written after the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 to
defend the proposed constitution and to explain in detail the meaning of various
parts of the document. During the 1960s and 1970s, the late Herbert J. Storing
compiled a collection of essays written in opposition to the Constitution during
the ratification debate. THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 41. Profes-
sor Storing's work is an invaluable research tool for the legal historian interested
in studying the many sides of the ratification debate.
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his position, he came to believe that the republican system of govern-
ment created by the Constitution would be better served if limits on
the potent political power granted to the federal government were es-
tablished and if checks on the strength of the majority were well-de-
fined.131 The United States Constitution was revised on December 15,
1791 to include ten of Madison's twelve proposed amendments, includ-
ing the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The privilege against self-incrimination "protects a witness from
providing oral or written testimony that would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed for criminal prosecution and attaches even if
that risk is remote, for it is the possibility, rather than the likelihood,
of prosecution that controls."' 32 The privilege thus may be called into
play in any situation involving "1) 'compelled' disclosure, 2) that is
'testimonial' and 3) 'incriminatory.'"133 It "must be accorded liberal
construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure."1 3 4
131. See KETCAm, supra note 129, at 289-90. Originally, Madison believed that a Bill
of Rights was unnecessary because the limited grant of power to the government
of the United States automatically ensured that the federal government could not
violate the civil liberties of the people. In fact, Madison was concerned that any
listing of rights that could not be violated by the government would lead to the
negative inference that those not reserved could be denied. In part, Madison
changed his mind due to his concern that the majority would abuse the power it
wielded.
[Tihe prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that
quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the
highest prerogative of power. But this is not found in either the Execu-
tive or Legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the
people, operating by the majority against the minority. It may be
thought that all paper barriers against the power of the community are
too weak to be worthy of attention; ... yet as they have a tendency to
impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion
in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be
one means to control the majority from those acts to which they might
otherwise be inclined.
Id. at 290. See also ROBERT RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER
59-69 (1987)(discussing Madison's role as advocate for the Bill of Rights).
132. In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing
United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1984)); Marine Midland
Bank, NA. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing
Pillsbury v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 265 n.1 (1983)(Marshall, J., concurring)); Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)); Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.,
113 F.R.D. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
133. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R.
821, 827 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United
States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 826 F.2d 1166, 1168 (2d Cir. 1987)); Rivoli
Grain Co. v. Litton (In re Litton), 74 B.R. 557, 559 (Bankr. C.D. IMl. 1987)(citing
In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 431 (Bankr. N.D. 1M1. 1986)).
134. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
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A disclosure is "compelled" whenever "physical or moral compul-
sion" is used against the individual asserting the privilege.13 5 Such
compulsion is present in the various discovery tools made available in
bankruptcy proceedings because a party can be compelled to provide,
and sanctioned for failure to provide, discovery information.' 3 6 Such
compulsion also is present in (1) meetings of creditors, because the
debtor is required to "appear and submit to examination under
oath,"137 and (2) in examinations ordered by the court, because the
party to be examined may be compelled by the court to attend, to sub-
mit to examination, and to produce documentary evidence.138 On the
other hand, such compulsion is absent with respect to "records re-
quired to be maintained by law and the contents of those voluntarily
prepared and regularly kept in the course of business."'13 9 Thus, such
documents are left unprotected by the privilege.
To be considered "testimonial," a "communication must itself, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information"
that conveys "the contents of an individual's mind."'140 A physical act
can constitute testimony if it "probe[s] the state of mind, memory, per-
ception, or cognition of the witness."'14 1 For example, while one ordi-
narily might not consider the act of producing documents testimonial,
such an act can be testimonial if it takes on testimonial and incrimi-
nating attributes, such as verifying the existence of the documents or
the accuracy of their contents. 14 2
Testimony is "incriminatory" when it "might or tends to incrimi-
nate."14 3 The threat of incrimination must be real. "[Tihe claimant
135. In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989)(quoting
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976); Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d
40, 46 (2d Cir. 1988)(quoting Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1911))).
136. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7030 (depositions upon oral examination), 7031 (deposi-
tions upon written request), 7033 (interrogatories), 7034 (production of docu-
ments and things and entry upon land for inspection and other purposes), 7035
(physical and mental examination of persons), 7036 (requests for admission),
7037 (sanctions).
137. 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343 (1994).
138. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004.
139. In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-12 & n.10 (1984)); In re Sealed Case, 877
F.2d 83, 87-88 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,
793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 402, 404
(D.D.C. 1989); In re Mudd, 95 B.R. 426, 431-32 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re
Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 440-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)(citing Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 33 (1948)).
140. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988).
141. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988)(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
142. Compare United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984)(protecting the act of
producing papers), with Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,411 (1976)(produc-
tion of papers not protected when existence and location is not at issue).
143. See Torcie v. Ruff (In re Growers Packing Co., Inc.), 150 B.R. 82, 83 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1993)(citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Emspak v.
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must be 'confronted by substantial and real,' and not merely trifling or
imaginary, hazards of incrimination."144 Put another way, "[t]he priv-
ilege protects against disclosure when a witness has a reasonable ap-
prehension, not merely an imaginary possibility, of disclosing
incriminating testimony."14 5 However, "[i]nformation is protected by
the privilege not only if it would support a criminal conviction, but
even if 'the responses would merely "provide a lead or clue" to evidence
having a tendency to incriminate.'" 46 The question of whether the
individual actually will be prosecuted is not an issue. "It is not a
court's role to speculate whether or not the witness will be prosecuted
once the determination has been made that the answers sought would
tend to incriminate."147
The Fifth Amendment privilege serves to protect individuals from
being compelled to testify about matters that potentially could subject
them to criminal liability. Under appropriate circumstances, how-
ever, the privilege may also extend to some corporate matters.
IV. CORPORATIONS
A corporation is considered a "person" for many purposes, includ-
ing determining who is eligible to file a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 peti-
tion.148 Yet, "[a] corporation is not a 'person' entitled to claim the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination."14 9 Only an
individual may assert a claim of privilege against self-incrimination.
"M[For purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other col-
lective entities are treated differently from individuals... [in that] a
corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege." 150 As a result, "a cor-
United States, 349 U.S. 190, 197 (1955); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,426
(1984)).
144. United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 1987)(quoting United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980)).
145. Torcie v. Ruff (In re Growers Packing Co., Inc.), 150 B.R. 82, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1993)(citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)(reasonable ap-
prehension); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951)(imaginary
possibility)).
146. In re Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 275 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)(quoting United States v.
Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980)).
147. In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing
United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1984)).
148. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41) (1994)("person' includes individual, partnership,
and corporation"); id. § 109(b) ("[a] person may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this
title); id. § 109(d) ("Ony a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this
title ... may be a debtor under chapter 11 of this title."). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)
(1994)("Only an individual... may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.").
149. In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986).
150. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988)(citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43 (1906)). See also In re Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R. 925, 927 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1990)("It is well settled that corporations and various other collective
entities are not entitled to assert any fifth amendment privilege since such a priv-
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porate officer cannot refuse to testify or produce corporate documents
on the grounds that he may thereby incriminate the corporation."'151
Moreover, "a representative of a corporation '[cannot] resist [a]
subpoena for corporate documents on the ground that the act of pro-
duction might tend to incriminate him."152 As the Supreme Court
noted in Braswell v. United States, 5 3
the Court has consistently recognized that the custodian of corporate or entity
records holds those documents in a representative rather than a personal ca-
pacity. Artificial corporations may act only through their agents ... and a
custodian's assumption of his representative capacity leads to certain obliga-
tions, including the duty to produce corporate records on proper demand by
the Government. Under those circumstances, the custodian's act of produc-
tion is not deemed a personal act, but rather an act of the corporation. Any
claim of Fifth Amendment privilege asserted by the agent would be tanta-
mount to a claim of privilege by the corporation-which of course possesses no
such privilege. 1 5
4
Under the circumstances, "[tihe fact that the production of such books
and records might tend to incriminate one acting in a representative
capacity personally is immaterial. 155
This is not to say that a corporate officer may never assert the Fifth
Amendment. "There is a distinction between individuals acting as
corporate officers and individuals in their personal capacity; in their
ilege is available only to natural individuals.")(citing Brasweil v. United States,
487 U.S. 99 (1988); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911)).
151. In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Wash 1986)(cit-
ing Curio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906); 9A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 4671 (rev. perm. ed. 1985)). See also In re Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R.
925, 927 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990)("It is also settled that when the business
records of a corporation are subpoenaed from the corporation or from the custo-
dian of records of the corporation, the officers or the custodian of records of the
corporation, in their representative capacity, cannot withhold production on fifth
amendment grounds.")(citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1985)).
152. In re Caucus Distribs., Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 896 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)(alteration
in original)(quoting Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988)). See also In re
Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R. 925, 927 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990)(stating
that an officer or custodian of records of a corporation may not withhold produc-
tion of business records "even if the production of the records would personally
incriminate the officer or custodian")(citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S.
99 (1988); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Morganstein), 771 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1985)).
153. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
154: rd. at 109-10.
155. -In re Einhorn, 33 B.R. 665, 667 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)(citing United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
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personal capacity they may be entitled to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination."'15 6 Upon being served with discovery requests,
however, a corporation is "obliged to appoint agents who can, without
fear of self-incrimination, furnish such requested information as is
available" to the corporation.15 7
"It would indeed be incongruous to permit a corporation to select an indi-
vidual to verify the corporation's answers, who because he fears self-incrimi-
nation may thus secure for the corporation the benefits of a privilege it does
not have." Such a result would effectively permit the corporation to assert on
its own behalf the personal privilege of its individual agents. 1 5 8
It is much easier for a former corporate officer or agent to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination. For example, in In re Toyota
of Morristown, Inc.,15 9 the plaintiffs in an adversary proceeding
caused a subpoena duces tecum to be served on the debtor's former
general manager. The subpoena sought the production of, among
other things, a box of telecopies that the former general manager al-
legedly took with him when he left the debtor's -employ. In quashing
the subpoena, the court noted that
Coleman [the former general manager] is neither an officer, agent, nor custo-
dian of records of Toyota of Morristown, Inc. Any act of producing corporate
records, whether the records are extra copies of records furnished to Coleman
or original records illicitly obtained by Coleman upon his departure from the
company, would be an act by Coleman, not in a representative capacity, but in
his personal capacity. Such an act, if incriminating, could be used by the gov-
ernment as evidence of a personal act or admission by Coleman. 1 6 0
The same result was reached under similar circumstances in In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum.16 1 In that case, a grand jury
issued and caused to be served on a former officer of a corporation a
subpoena duces tecum, which sought the production of various corpo-
rate records that the former officer was alleged to have misappropri-
ated when he left the company. While acknowledging the rule that a
corporate officer cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege with re-
spect to corporate documents in his possession, the court nevertheless
reversed the district court's order enforcing the subpoena, stating that
[o]nce the officer leaves the company's employ ... he no longer acts as a corpo-
rate representative but functions in an individual capacity in his possession of
corporate records. Although his possession of them as a private citizen may
have been derived from his wrongful misappropriation of them from the corpo-
ration, we do not view such conduct as depriving him, once the documents are
in his possession (rather than as a corporate representative), of his right
156. In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 B.R. 643, 649 (W.D. Wash. 1986)(citing
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957)).
157. Slon-Stiver v. Kossoff (In re Tower Metal Alloy Co.), 188 B.R. 954, 957 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1995)(citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8 (1970)).
158. Id. (citations ommitted).
159. 120 B.R. 925 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990).
160. Id. at 929.
161. 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
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under the Fifth Amendment to invoke the act of production doctrine outlined
in Fisher [v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)1.162
The Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum decision was followed in
In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc.,1 6 3 in which the court was asked to compel
a debtor's former president to turn over the contents of three boxes of
records that he had brought with him to a Rule 2004 examination pur-
suant to a subpoena, but refused to surrender. Because "the subpoena
was issued some four months after Allen [the former president] ceased
to be the Debtor's president and was directed at him personally, and
not at the Debtor-who would then presumably have been obligated to
designate an agent to produce the requested records," the court upheld
the former president's claim of privilege.1 6 4
No longer the Debtor's officer, Allen only possesses the corporate records in a
personal capacity and is fully able to shield himself under the act of produc-
tion doctrine. Thus, in certain situations where there is no agency, such as
those involving an ex-employee, an individual's Fifth Amendment rights can
provide a limited exception to the non-privileged act of producing corporate
documents, undercutting the collective entity rule.1 65
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the privilege against self-in-
crimination applies not only with respect to oral testimony, but also
with respect to written testimony, i.e., documents. The extent to
which the Fifth Amendment protects against the compelled produc-
tion of documents is discussed in detail below.
V. DOCUMENTS
Documents may be incriminating in two ways. First, and perhaps
more obviously, the contents of documents may be incriminating.
Nevertheless, the simple act of producing documents also may be
incriminating.1 66
The privilege against self-incrimination was first extended to the
contents of documents by the United States Supreme Court in Boyd v.
United States.167 The continued validity of Boyd has been called into
question by a number of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, how-
ever. For example, in Fisher v. United States,1 6 8 the Supreme Court
162. Id. at 986-87 (citation omitted).
163. 107 B.R. 821 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989). But see In re Stoecker, 103 B.R. 182, 187
n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)(noting that the Seventh Circuit had not adopted the In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum "extension of Fisher").
164. In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 830 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
165. Id. (citing SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 843 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1988); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985); Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 649 F. Supp. 281, 287 (N.D. Il1. 1986); In re
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 1178, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
166. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985)(citing United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 613 n.11 (1984)).
167. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
168. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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refused to extend the privilege to the contents of an accountant's work
papers. Similarly, in United States v. Doe,169 the Supreme Court re-
fused to extend the privilege to the contents of a sole proprietor's busi-
ness records. In her concurring opinion in Doe, Justice O'Connor even
went so far as to say that she was writing "to make explicit what is
implicit in the [Supreme Court's] analysis of... [Boyd]: that the Fifth
Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of pri-
vate papers of any kind."170
While these decisions would appear to "all but eliminate any privi-
lege based on the contents of incriminating documents,"171 the possi-
bility still exists that the privilege might extend to the contents of
private papers in those rare situations involving a significant invasion
of privacy. Notwithstanding the unequivocal statement in Fisher that
"the Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination,
not [the disclosure of] private information," 172 at least one court has
considered extending the privilege under such circumstances.
In Butcher v. Bailey,' 73 the bankruptcy court upheld the debtor's
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to
certain personal records that related to property of the bankruptcy es-
tate. 174 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provided the
following analysis:
Although we do not read either [Fisher or Doe] as holding that the contents of
private papers are never privileged, it is evident from the dialogue between
Justice Marshall and Justice O'Connor, in their concurring opinions in Doe ...
that if contents are protected at all, it is only in rare situations, where com-
pelled disclosure would break "the heart of our sense of privacy." 175
Unfortunately for the debtor in Butcher, the court was not persuaded
that the disclosure of the records in that case was sufficiently invasive
of the debtor's privacy interests to warrant extending the privilege to
prevent their disclosure. As a result, the court reversed the bank-
ruptcy court's decision.
The records... are personal records, but only those personal records which
relate to property of the bankrupts estate. Information relating to property of
the estate is not so intimately personal as to evoke serious concern over pri-
vacy interests, particularly in bankruptcy where the trustee has a strong in-
terest in knowing the nature and scope of the estate's holdings. 17 6
169. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
170. Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. In re Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R. 925, 929 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990).
172. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976)(citing United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
173. 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985).
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
175. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985)(citations ommitted).
176. Id.
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Thus, even private papers are not considered privileged unless the
production of them is somehow testimonial and they involve extremely
private matters. 177
While the content of documents may no longer be privileged, "[t]he
act of producing... documents... may be privileged if such produc-
tion is compelled, testimonial, and incriminating."' 7 8 Determining
whether the production of a given document is privileged "may...
depend on the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes
thereof."179
The element of compulsion has been found to be missing in a
number of older Supreme Court cases involving the records of a debtor
in bankruptcy. For example, in In re Harris,'S0 the Supreme Court
held that a debtor could not assert the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation to avoid turning his books and records over to an interim re-
ceiver. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes concluded that
no constitutional rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of
surrender-not of compelling the bankrupt to be a witness against himself in
a criminal case, present or future, but of compelling him to yield possession of
property that he is no longer entitled to keep. If a trustee had been appointed,
the title to the books would have vested in him by the express terms of Section
70 [of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898], and the bankrupt could not have withheld
possession of what he no longer owned, on the ground that otherwise he might
be punished. That is one of the misfortunes of bankruptcy if it follows crime.
The right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself is not a right to
appropriate property that may tell one's story.' 8 1
Harris appears to remain good law, having been relied upon by the
Supreme Court in more recent cases, such as Fisher v. United
States.'8 2
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, does not share this
interpretation of the precedential value that should be afforded
Harris.
At the time Harris was decided... the Court had not yet come around to the
view that the act of production itself could be testimonial. That view, implicit
in the later cases of Dier, Johnson, and Fuller, has more recently been ex-
pressly recognized .... Because Harris is inconsistent with this subsequent
development, we believe that it is no longer controlling. 1 8 3
177. In re Tower Metal Alloy Co., 200 B.R. 598, 606 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996)(citing
Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985)).
178. In re Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R. 925, 929 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990)(cit-
ing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465
(6th Cir. 1985)).
179. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
180. 221 U.S. 274 (1911).
181. Id. at 279-80. See also Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1923); In re Fuller,
262 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1923); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1913).
182. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
183. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Only time-and the United States Supreme Court-will determine
the extent to which Harris remains good law.
The element of compulsion also has been discounted-or, perhaps
more accurately, disregarded-in at least three other situations that
have bankruptcy implications. First, it is "well-settled law that a pub-
lic official has no Fifth Amendment right to withhold public records
from grand jury review even if the records tend to incriminate the offi-
cial in a specific crime."' 8 4 In discussing this "public records" excep-
tion, the Supreme Court has noted that
in the case of public records and official documents, made or kept in the ad-
ministration of public office, the fact of actual possession or of lawful custody
would not justify the officer in resisting inspection, even though the record
was made by himself and would supply the evidence of his criminal derelic-
tion. If he has embezzled the public moneys and falsified the public accounts,
he cannot seal his official records and withhold them from the prosecuting
authorities on a plea of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
1 8 5
To illustrate this principle, the Supreme Court cited cases refusing to
extend the privilege to a "vestry clerk,"1s6 a "state dispenser," 8 7 and a
"druggist,"ss each of whom was required by law to maintain certain
records. The Supreme Court summarized various courts' reasoning as
follows:
The fundamental ground of decision in this class of cases, is that where, by
virtue of their character and the rules of law applicable to them, the books and
papers are held subject to examination by the demanding authority, the custo-
dian has no privilege to refuse production although their contents tend to
criminate him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the incident obliga-
tion to permit inspection.1 8 9
The public records exception has been applied in the context of a
motion to remove a Chapter 7 trustee.190 In In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings,19 1 the bankruptcy court denied a Chapter 7 trustee's asser-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination and ordered him to
turn over to the United States Trustee all documents pertaining to his
administration of a Chapter 7 case in which he had resigned in re-
sponse to the United States Trustee's motion to remove him. On ap-
peal, the district court first found that the trustee "in his official
capacity as Chapter 7 trustee" was "an 'officer of the court.'"19 2 The
court then concluded that "all of the records relating to [the trustee's]
184. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 119 B.R. 945, 949 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
185. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
186. Id. at 380 (citing Bradshaw v. Murphy, 7 Car. & P. 612, 173 Eng. Rep. 269
(1836)).
187. Id. at 380-81 (citing State v. Farnum, 53 S.E. 83 (1905)).
188. Id. at 381 (citing State v. Donovan, 86 N.W. 709 (1901); State v. Davis, 18 S.W.
894 (1892)).
189. Id. at 381-82.
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 324 (1994).
191. 119 B.R. 945 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
192. Id. at 949.
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administration of the bankruptcy estate are subject to compelled dis-
closure ... notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment."193
[Tihe position of Chapter 7 Trustee is a public office, well within the class of
cases discussed... by the Supreme Court in Wilson [v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911)]. First, [the trustee] was appointed by the Bankruptcy Court to
that position and served in that capacity under supervision of the Bankruptcy
Court. Second,... the position of bankruptcy trustee is deemed by Congress
to be an "officer of the court." Third, in voluntarily undertaking the position of
trustee, [the trustee] took on the explicit duties set out in Section 704 of the
Bankruptcy Code, including the duty to maintain records, and the duty to
make an accounting.1 9 4
While the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 or 12 case is not an
officer of the court, such a debtor is subject to the supervision of the
court and has many of the duties of a trustee, including specifically
the duty to maintain records and the duty to make an accounting.195
That being so, compelling the production of such a debtor's postpeti-
tion books and records would seem to be a logical extension of the pub-
lic records exception.196
Under certain circumstances, the private records of a private indi-
vidual may be entitled to no greater protection than public records:
"an individual can, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment, be com-
pelled to produce private records if the requested records fall within
the 'required records' exception to the Fifth Amendment."'19 7 This sec-
ond situation in which the element of compulsion has been discounted
arises when the following circumstances exist: "First, the purposes of
the government's inquiry must be essentially regulatory, rather than
criminal. Second, the records must contain the type of information
that the regulated party would ordinarily keep. Third, the records
'must have assumed "public aspects" which render them at least
analogous to public documents.'"' 9 8 Several bankruptcy courts have
applied this rule (the "Underhill test") in requiring individuals to turn
over their books and records.
193. Id. at 950.
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106-1107, 1203 (1994). The duties of a Chapter 13 debtor
are not coextensive with the duties of a trustee. A Chapter 13 debtor engaged in
business is required only to file the periodic operating reports described in
§ 704(8). Id. § 1304(c).
196. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 119 B.R. 945, 949-50 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
197. Id. at 948 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecuin Served Upon Un-
derbill, 781 F.2d 64, 67 (6th Cir. 1986)). At least one court has commented that
the required records exception "amounts to a waiver of any Fifth Amendment
claim." In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
198. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon Underhill, 781 F.2d 64, 67
(6th Cir. 1986)(citing Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968)(inter-
preting Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948))).
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For example, in Matter of Jim's Garage,199 the bankruptcy court
applied the Underhill test in ruling that a Chapter 7 trustee had to
comply with a court order directing him to turn over to the United
States Trustee all records pertaining to his administration of a Chap-
ter 7 estate. With respect to the first element of this test, the court
drew the following conclusion:
[I]t can [not] be reasonably argued that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
which directly or indirectly mandate the keeping of the records sought can be
said to serve only criminal prosecution purposes. Nor can it be argued that
such provisions do not have as their primary purpose the proper administra-
tion of bankruptcy estates and the enablement of those charged with the over-
sight and supervision of bankruptcy trustees, to perform their statutory
duties, in connection therewith.
2 0 0
With respect to the second element, the court found that
[a] trustee cannot comply with the mandate that he "keep a record of receipts
and the disposition of money and property received" and "file the reports and
summaries required", unless he keeps the records sought in this case. The
filing of reports mandated by various sections of the statutes and rules, neces-
sarily implies the maintenance of underlying records necessary for the prepa-
ration of those reports. It cannot be reasonably argued that such records
would not be ordinarily kept by a case trustee.
2 0 1
Finally, with respect to the third element, the court found that
[tihe periodic reports which a trustee is required to "file", are by virtue of
those filings, public records in any sense of that term. Should there be a ques-
tion or issue as to the "account" of a trustee (accounts which themselves are
specifically or in effect allowed by the court after a hearing or an opportunity
for one) a party in interest would be entitled or be given the opportunity to
inspect the underlying records which afford the basis for such accountings.
2 0 2
A bankruptcy court's application of this test in other cases has po-
tentially wide-ranging consequences. As noted above, a Chapter 11 or
12 debtor in possession has the same duty as a trustee to maintain
records, file periodic reports, and make a final accounting.20 3 A court
applying the Underhill test could therefore logically conclude that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to such a debtor's
postpetition books and records.
The third situation in which the element of compulsion has been
discounted is exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Balti-
more City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight.204 In that case,
199. 118 B.R. 949 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989), affd on other grounds sub nom., In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 119 B.R. 945 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
200. Id. at 951.
201. Id. at 952-53.
202. Id. at 953.
203. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1994), amended by 98 Stat. 381, 98 Stat. 355, 100 Stat. 3100;
id. § 1106 (1994), amended by 98 Stat. 355, 100 Stat. 3114, 98 Stat. 384; id.
§ 1107 (1994), amended by 98 Stat. 384, 1203, repealed by 100 Stat. 3121. A
Chapter 13 debtor engaged in business, on the other hand, has only the duty to
file periodic reports. See id. § 1304(c), amended by 98 Stat. 355.
204. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
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a mother suspected of abusing her child was permitted to retain cus-
tody, but only under conditions imposed by the juvenile court. When
the Department of Social Services later sought and obtained an order
to place the child in foster care, the mother refused to produce the
child and was held in contempt. The mother then challenged the con-
tempt order on the ground that it violated her Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. In denying the mother's challenge, the Court held that
[t]he possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions
that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the
privilege to resist production .... Even assuming that this limited testimo-
nial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and "sufficiently testimonial for
purposes of the privilege," Bouknight [the mother] may not invoke the privi-
lege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties
related to production and because production is required as part of a noncrim-
inal regulatory regime. 2 0 5
In recognizing that the Fifth Amendment does not in every situation
prohibit compelling the production of incriminating evidence, the
Supreme Court appears to have applied a balancing test of sorts, with
the individual's interest in not producing the evidence on one side of
the scale, and the government's interest in maintaining its noncrimi-
nal regulatory regimes on the other.2 06
The Supreme Court's reasoning would seem to apply with respect
to a debtor's books and records.
There are some regulatory disclosure requirements in modern society that
have to be complied with even though there may in fact be some incidental
incriminating effects upon the party required to comply-provided that the
regulatory requirements in question are strictly noncriminal in nature and
have general applicability throughout the society. That is essentially what
the Supreme Court did in [Bouknight] ....
It cannot be said that the Bankruptcy Code provides a regulatory or inves-
tigative regime designed to ferret out prospective criminal defendants.... On
the other hand, it can be said that liquidation of business cases under Chapter
7 of the Code would be severely hampered, if not rendered impossible, were
the bankruptcy debtor able to withhold from the trustee the books and records
of the business on grounds of possible incriminatory effects as to certain of
those records.2 0 7
A debtor who files a voluntary bankruptcy assumes the responsibility
of producing records that relate to her prepetition financial affairs. A
Chapter 11 or 12 debtor assumes the additional fiduciary responsibili-
ties of a debtor in possession and must account for the administration
of the estate to his creditors and the court. In cases in which the
debtor is asked to produce documents that relate to these matters, the
protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment seems to be lessened by
205. Id. at 555-56 (citation omitted).
206. See In re Fairbanks, 135 B.R. 717, 730-31, 733 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).
207. Id. at 730-31, 733.
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the Bouknight rationale because this information is required as part
of a noncriminal regulatory process.
This was the holding in In re Ross,208 in which the bankruptcy
court cited both Bouknight and Fairbanks in support of the proposi-
tion that "even if the act of production involved here was both testimo-
nial and incriminating, the nature of Chapter 7 as a regulatory regime
directed toward society as a whole, and not toward inherently suspect
criminal classes, renders the act of production outside the protection
of the Fifth Amendment."20 9 This line of cases suggests that some
wayward debtors and trustees may have a difficult time relying upon
the Fifth Amendment as a means of keeping records they are required
to maintain out of the hands of creditors and other interested parties
who wish to see them.
Assuming the element of compulsion is shown, an individual must
also demonstrate that the act of producing the requested documents is
"testimonial" to avoid the production of documents on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds.2 0 Such an act "may be testimonial in any of three
ways: by acknowledging that the documents exist; by acknowledging
that they are in the control of the person producing them; or by ac-
knowledging that the person producing them believes they are the
documents requested and thereby authenticating them for purposes of
Fed.R.Evid. 901."231 The act of producing documents, however, "is not
considered testimonial if each of these considerations is a 'foregone
conclusion." 2 12
For example, in Fisher v. United States,21 3 the Supreme Court held
that a taxpayer's turning over his accountant's work papers was not
testimonial because the existence and location of the work papers
were known, and the taxpayer's production of them would not be suffi-
cient authentication to permit their introduction as evidence. In
United States v. Doe,2 i4 however, the Court held that an individual's
turning over his business records was testimonial because the exist-
ence and location of the records were not known, and the individual's
208. 156 B.R. 272 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
209. Id. at 281.
210. See In re Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R. 925, 929 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1990)(citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.
1985)).
211. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985)(citing United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 613 n.11 (1984)).
212. Id. at 469 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984)(quoting
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976))).
213. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
214. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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production of them would be sufficient authentication to permit their
introduction as evidence.2 15
In Butcher v. Bailey,216 the bankruptcy court ordered the debtor to
turn over to the Chapter 7 trustee various personal records that re-
lated to property of the bankruptcy estate. On appeal, the Sixth Cir-
cuit quickly disposed of any argument regarding the first two Doe
considerations. "As in Fisher, there is no serious doubt that personal
records of debtor exist. Further, it is a foregone conclusion, bordering
on a tautology, that [the] debtor has control of his personal
records."2 17 The Court felt differently about the third consideration,
however. "As in Doe, however, and unlike Fisher, debtor's production
of these records would be sufficient to authenticate them as his per-
sonal records. In any future criminal prosecution, therefore, the gov-
ernment would be relieved of the need to authenticate these
records."2 18 Thus, the Court concluded that the act of producing the
records would be testimonial.
In In re Lederman,2 19 the bankruptcy court reached a different
conclusion with respect to a Chapter 11 debtor's books and records. In
that case, the debtor's disclosure statement2 20 indicated that the in-
formation contained in it was derived from the debtor's books, records,
and files, and that such books, records, and files had been disclosed in
their entirety to the creditors committee2 21 and others. Based on
these circumstances, the court concluded that "[biased on the previous
disclosure of all of [the debtor's] books, records, and files... we believe
that '[tihe existence and location of the documents were foregone con-
clusions. By conceding that he has the papers, the [debtor] would add
little or nothing to the government's information."222 As for authenti-
cation, the court cited In re Connelly2 23 for the proposition that when
documents have been prepared by third parties, the government
would need to offer other authenticating testimony to have them ad-
mitted into evidence against an individual. Under such circum-
215. See also In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 830 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989)(holding that with respect to corporate records allegedly in the possession of
a former corporate officer, "[tihe existence of records other than corporate docu-
ments required by law are not 'foregone conclusions' and their production...
could amount to a 'formal testimonial admission.").
216. 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985).
217. Id. at 469.
218. Id. (citation omitted).
219. 140 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
220. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994), amended by 98 Stat. 385, 98 Stat. 386.
221. See id. § 1102, amended by 100 Stat. 3101, 98 Stat. 384.
222. Charter Fed. Sav. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140 B.R. 49, 56 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992)(second alteration in original)(quoting In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421,
438 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1986)).
223. 59 B.R. 421, 438 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1986).
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stances, requiring the production of such documents did not represent
a substantial threat of self-incrimination. 22 4
The third and final element that an individual seeking to avoid the
production of documents on Fifth Amendment grounds must establish
is that the act of producing the requested documents is "incriminat-
ing."22 5 As the court noted in Butcher, "[iut is here that the distinction
between the production of documents and the contents of documents
becomes murky."2 26
In most cases, it may be unnecessary to make such a distinction. If
the contents of a document are not incriminating, the act of producing
that document would not be incriminating. 'There can be nothing in-
criminating about authenticating an innocuous document. Authenti-
cation cannot be incriminating unless the contents of the document
tend to incriminate. 2 27 The same reasoning would seem to apply
with respect to acknowledging that an innocuous document exists or*
that it is in the control of the individual producing it.
On the other hand, if the contents of a document are incriminating,
the act of producing that document ordinarily would be incriminating.
Producing the document could relieve the government of the need to
establish the document's existence, location, and authenticity, each of
which would constitute "a link in the chain of evidence needed to pros-
ecute"228 the debtor. Of course, if each of these considerations is a
foregone conclusion, the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the
debtor would be complete, and the act of producing the document-as
opposed to the contents of the document-would not be incriminating.
"If the [court] determines that the authentication of... the documents
is a foregone conclusion, then it may order production of those docu-
ments regardless of their incriminating nature. 22 9
If a witness concludes that complying with a request to testify or
produce documents may result in the disclosure of incriminating infor-
mation, she will need to know how to assert her Fifth Amendment
rights. The Fifth Amendment offers no protection if the privilege
against self-incrimination is not invoked in a timely and proper
manner.
224. Charter Fed. Say. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140 B.R. 49, 56 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992).
225. See In re Toyota of Morristown, Inc., 120 B.R. 925, 929 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1990)(citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Butcher v. Bailey, 753
F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985)).
226. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1985).
227. Id.
228. Hoflman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
229. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 1985).
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VI. INVOKING THE PRIVILEGE
While the defendant in a criminal proceeding has the absolute
right to refuse to take the witness stand, "[i]n any other situation, the
privilege [against self-incrimination] does not permit a person to avoid
being sworn as a witness or being asked questions. Rather the person
must listen to the questions and specifically invoke the privilege
rather than answer the questions."230
Thus, for the witness who is not a criminal defendant, the privilege
must be invoked with respect to each individual question. "[A] total or
blanket assertion of privilege claimed in advance of the questions can
run afoul of the 'reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct
answer' standard mandated by [the Supreme Court in] Hoffnan [v.
United States23 1] ..... "232 Under that standard, an individual invok-
ing the privilege must have "reasonable cause to fear self-incrimina-
tion if the question is answered." 2 3 3 Such reasonable cause may be
found whenever a nexus exists between the possibility of prosecution
and the answer to the question being posed.23 4
In In re Hulon,235 the bankruptcy court applied these general prin-
ciples in determining whether a debtor could refuse to be sworn at a
Rule 2004 examination ordered by the court at the request of the
Chapter 7 trustee. The debtor previously had testified at a § 341
meeting of creditors and was the subject of an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation. The court rejected the debtor's argument that under the cir-
cumstances the very act of being sworn was incriminating.
The court is not persuaded that, because of the threat of incrimination of any
relevant question, the debtor is totally excused from responding to relevant
inquiries. The debtor is entitled to invoke the privilege only to genuinely
threatening questions and therefore, is required to take the oath and listen to
each question propounded by the trustee.
2 3 6
In other words, one who wishes to invoke the privilege must have a
basis for invoking it with respect to each question that he refuses to
answer.
Once an individual invokes the Fifth Amendment, the court must
determine the validity of the claim of privilege. "The witness is not
exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in doing
230. In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
231. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
232. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49, 53-54 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1989)(citation omitted).
233. New York City Shoes, Inc. v. Best Shoe Corp., 106 B.R. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1989)(cit-
ing United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980); Mason v. United States, 244
U.S. 362 (1917)).
234. Marine Midland Bank, N-. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing In re Potter, 88 B.R. 843, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)).
235. 92 B.R. 670 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
236. Id. at 675 (citation omitted).
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so he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish
the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his si-
lence is justified ..... 2 37
In keeping with the importance of the protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment, the individual's burden of persuasion is not partic-
ularly heavy in most cases.
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the
question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the
claim "must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiari-
ties of the case as by the facts actually in evidence."
2 3 8
But, "if the incriminatory nature is not obvious from the question...
the witness must explain in a limited fashion how his answer will be
incriminatory. 23 9 This also would be true if the court initially decides
that a question poses no real threat of self-incrimination. In this case,
"it then becomes incumbent 'upon the defendant to show that answers
to [the questions] might criminate him."240 The individual must
make "some positive disclosure . . .of [the question's] hidden dan-
gers."24 1 The court must then go further and "conduct a particular-
ized inquiry into the scope and legitimacy of the claim with regard to
each question asked."2 42
In some cases, the need to disclose at least partially the incriminat-
ing facts intended to be protected from disclosure obviously puts both
the individual asserting the privilege and the court conducting the
particularized inquiry in an awkward position.
It is the nature of the inquiry into the witness's reasons for apprehending
danger which has presented a difficult problem for courts, because of the
tricky balance between a necessary investigation of the circumstances sur-
rounding a claim of privilege and, by this investigation, the process of forcing
a witness to surrender some of the protection afforded by the privilege.
2 4 3
As noted by Judge Learned Hand, however, neither the individual nor
the court has any other option.
Obviously a witness may not be compelled to do more than show that the an-
swer is likely to be dangerous to him, else he will be forced to disclose those
very facts which the privilege protects. Logically, indeed, he is boxed in a par-
237. Hoffnan v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)(citing Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 362 (1951)).
238. Id. at 486-87 (quoting Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1896)).
239. Marine Midland Bank, NA. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1989)(citing United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir.
1983); In re J.M.V., Inc., 90 B.R. 737, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)).
240. In re Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 281 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)(quoting United States v.
Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 1980)(alteration in original)).
241. Hashagen v. United States, 283 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1960).
242. Marine Midland Bank, NAL v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1989).
243. In re J.M.V., Inc., 90 B.R. 737, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
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adox, for he must prove the criminatory character of what it is his privilege to
suppress just because it is criminatory. The only practicable solution is to be
content with the door's being set a little ajar, and while at times this no doubt
partially destroys the privilege... nothing better is available. 2 4 4
In making the requisite showing, the individual asserting the priv-
ilege is not always required to offer testimony in support of the claim
of privilege. In In re French,2 45 the debtors operated a grain hauling
business. Shortly before the filing of their Chapter 11 petition, the
debtors allegedly sold a customer's grain without the customer's per-
mission and kept the proceeds. At the continued § 341 meeting of
creditors, Mr. French refused to answer six questions related to an
equitable lien claimed by the feed mill to whom the debtors sold the
grain; the debtors' bank accounts; and debtors' cashing of checks. In
deciding that Mr. French could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege
without giving testimony regarding the basis for his claim, the bank-
ruptcy court noted that "[tio avoid forcing the witness to risk self-in-
crimination in order to assert the privilege, potential incrimination is
generally shown by argument of counsel."2 46 The court elaborated
that "[i]n practice, the invoker's attorney need only sketch a scenario
of how a possible but still unknown response might provide direct or
circumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or clues leading to evi-
dence of criminal conduct."247 Based upon the record before it, which
did not include the debtors' testimony, the court found in Mr. French's
favor.
Mr. French is clearly entitled to refuse to answer ASCS' question regarding
Peterson Feed Mill's alleged equitable hen .... The alleged equitable mort-
gage may have arisen from Mr. French's sales to Peterson Feed Mill of grain
he did not own .... Mr. French is also entitled to refuse to answer the re-
maining five questions, all of which involve bank accounts and the cashing of
checks. Mr. French must have cashed the checks he received from the alleged,
illicit grain sales somewhere. Consequently, there is a reasonable probability
that Mr. French would furnish "a link in the chain of evidence needed to pros-
ecute" him if he truthfully answered questions regarding his bank accounts
and check-cashing practices. 2 4 8
Thus, a judge called upon to decide whether the privilege has been
properly invoked is justified in using "common sense" in her analysis.
244. United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Marine
Midland Bank, N.A. v. Endres (In re Endres), NA. 103 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1989)(That this minimal showing might partially comprise the very
privilege, and protection, sought to be asserted cannot be avoided in maintaining
the delicate balance between a litigant's right to information and a witness' con-
stitutional right to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.").
245. 127 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
246. Id. at 437.
247. Id. (quoting Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege
in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1073 (1982)).
248. Id. at 439-40 (quoting In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (6th Cir. 1983)).
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The individual asserting the privilege, however, may be required to
testify in support of the claim of privilege in certain circumstances.
For example, in In re Morganroth,24 9 the witness refused to answer
certain questions that he had been asked and had answered in a dif-
ferent proceeding before a different court. The witness claimed that
by truthfully answering the questions in the pending proceeding, he
might incriminate himself for perjury in the earlier proceeding. The
court, however, concluded that under such circumstances the witness'
statement under oath was necessary to support a determination that
his assertion of the privilege was proper.
The Hoffnan guidelines [permitting reliance upon the arguments of counsel
in lieu of testimony] ... are of little help in a case ... where the... [clourt
making the privilege determination has no personal knowledge of the scope of
content of prior proceedings and where the only possible prosecution for which
the witness is at risk is perjury .... In Hoffman,... [the witness'] invocation
of the privilege was to protect against the prosecution for substantive crimes.
Therefore, the elements of the underlying violation and the necessary facts to
support them could be inferred by the trial court. 2
5 0
Thus, where the court has insufficient information to assess the un-
derlying factual basis for an individual's Fifth Amendment claim,
a witness must supply personal statements under oath or provide evidence
with respect to each question propounded to him to indicate the nature of the
criminal charge which provides the basis for his fear of prosecution and, if
necessary to complement non-testimonial evidence, personal statements
under oath to meet the standard for establishing reasonable cause to fear
prosecution .... 
2 5 1
In Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas,2 52 a judgment debtor under indict-
ment for theft, forgery, and mail fraud refused to answer questions
put to him by the judgment creditor in a supplementary proceeding
intended to discover assets. The trial court was unable to determine
the incriminating nature of such seemingly innocent matters as the
debtor's place of birth, his current address, and any litigation to which
he was a party. Thus, the trial court demanded the debtor explain
more fully the basis for his claim of privilege with respect to such
questions. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's analysis.
"Clearly some additional explanation was called for and the district
court correctly concluded that [the judgment debtor] . . . could safely
offer additional explanation without risking incrimination from the
explanation itself."253 The court of appeals was careful to note that
the trial court properly upheld the debtor's refusal to answer a
249. 718 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1983).
250. Id. at 168.
251. Id. at 169-70.
252. 634 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1980)(per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1025 (1980).
253. Id. at 361.
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number of other, less innocuous questions, without requiring the
debtor to testify in support of the claim of privilege.2 54
In In re Connelly,2 55 the bankruptcy court was confronted with a
Chapter 7 debtor who disclosed only his name, social security number,
and post office address on his petition. The debtor refused on Fifth
Amendment grounds to provide the information requested in his
schedules and statements, and refused to testify at his § 341 meeting
of creditors. After first noting that this was "not the ordinary case
where the privilege is asserted in a discrete adversary proceeding or
hearing and does not impede basic bankruptcy administration, 2 56 the
court concluded that
[Debtor] must tender to the court some credible reason why fulfilling his stat-
utory duties and disclosing specific information or surrendering certain prop-
erty to the trustee poses a real danger of incrimination, not a remote and
speculative possibility....
... [Debtor's] sworn statement by personal affidavit will be required be-
cause the possible penalty of peijury may be the sole assurance against
debtor's spurious assertion of the Fifth Amendment.... [Debtor's] counsel
may supply argument therefrom but not the facts necessary for the court's
determination. 2 5 7
Read broadly, Connelly could stand for the proposition that an individ-
ual must always testify in support of a claim of privilege. 258
If the court determines there is insufficient justification for an indi-
vidual's claim of privilege, the individual may be ordered to answer
the question giving rise to the claim. "A witness may be compelled to
answer a question if it is clear that she or he is mistaken with regard
to the justification for the privilege."2 59 Nevertheless, it should be
"'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances
in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer cannot
possibly have such tendency' to incriminate. 260 The individual as-
serting the privilege is entitled to every benefit of the doubt.261
At the same time, however, the individual asserting the privilege is
not always entitled to its protection. In some situations, the individ-
ual's prior conduct may amount to a waiver of the privilege. To avoid
this pitfall, attorneys carefully need to prepare their clients before al-
lowing them to make any oral or written statements that might tend
to incriminate them.
254. Id. at 360.
255. 59 B.R. 421 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1986).
256. Id. at 430.
257. Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
258. See In re French, 127 B.R. 434, 437 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
259. New York City Shoes, Inc. v. Best Shoe Corp., 106 B.R. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
260. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951)(citing Temple v. Common-
wealth, 75 Va. 892, 899 (1880)(emphasis in original)). 1,,
261. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 661 F.2d 1145,, 1151 (7th Cir. 1981),
affd sub nom., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983).
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VII. WAIVER
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
waived 26 2 if it is not invoked.263 For many years, a waiver of the priv-
ilege had to be knowing and intelligent.2 64 That is no longer the case
in a noncustodial setting. In Garner v. United States,26 5 the Supreme
Court held "that an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege
[against self-incrimination] without making a knowing and intelligent
waiver."266 Such a waiver may now "be inferred from a witness'
course of conduct or prior statements concerning the subject of the
case."26 7 Yet, "a waiver will not be lightly inferred,"268 and "[clourts
indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a testimonial
waiver."2 69
In considering whether an individual has waived the privilege
against self-incrimination, it is important to understand the distinc-
tion between testimony that merely provides the details concerning
the facts to which the individual has previously testified and testi-
mony that provides new facts. The Supreme Court explained the dis-
tinction in Rogers v. United States.2 70
262. It has been argued that "[t]he word 'waiver' is no longer used in the context of the
privilege against self-incrimination. A witness is now said to 'lose the benefit' of
the privilege against self-incrimination." Torcie v. Ruff (In re Growers Packing
Co., Inc.), 150 B.R. 82, 83 n.1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)(citing Minnesota v. Mur-
phy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-54
(1976)).
263. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)(citing United States v. Mur-
dock, 2.84 U.S. 141, 148 (1931)).
264. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274,
287 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942).
265. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
266. Id at 654 n.9. See also Stacey v. Solem, 801 F.2d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 1986).
267. Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996)(citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)). See also
Edmond v. Consumer Protection Div. (In re Edmond), 934 F.2d 1304, 1307-08
(4th Cir. 1991); Charter Fed. Say. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140 B.R. 49
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); Holiday Bank v. Scarfia (In re Scarfia), 104 B.R. 462
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 129 B.R. 671 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Norbank v. Kroh (In
re Kroh), 87 B.R. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); Rivoli Grain Co. v. Litton
(In re Litton), 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. M]1. 1987).
268. In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988)(citing Klein v. Harris, 667
F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981).
269. In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (citing Klein v. Harris, 667
F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)(citations omitted)). But see Scarfila v. Holiday Bank,
129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)("A debtor seeking relief from his obli-
gations pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code and in a Bankruptcy Court does so
willingly and voluntarily and is not entitled to as much consideration in being
compelled to testify as would another witness who had no interest in the
proceeding.").
270. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Since the privilege against self-incrimination presupposes a real danger of
legal detriment arising from the disclosure, [an individual] cannot invoke the
privilege where response to the specific question in issue... would not further
incriminate her. Disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details. Thus,
if the [witness] himself elects to waive his privilege... and discloses his crimi-
nal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full
disclosure .... As to each question to which a claim of privilege is directed,
the court must determine whether the answer to that particular question
would subject the witness to a "real danger" of further crimination.2 7 1
Thus, where an individual's subsequent testimony would only flesh
out her prior testimony, a waiver is likely to be found.
Courts are reluctant to allow an individual to rely on the privilege
against self-incrimination as a shield after he has previously offered a
one-sided version of the facts as a sword swung at the other side.
To allow the Debtor to plead a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege [after hav-
ing testified] and refuse to answer any further questions on the subjects cov-
ered in his earlier testimony would allow the Debtor to prematurely close the
door which he freely opened. The law, however, does not permit a witness to
open the door just wide enough to offer the Court an impaired view of the
facts. Once the witness voluntarily opens the door, the Court may open it
completely, and scrutinize every exposed matter.2
7 2
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that an individual may "refuse
to answer any questions about a matter already discussed, even if the
facts already revealed are incriminating, as long as the answers
sought may tend to further incriminate [her]."273
In Klein v. Harris,274 the Second Circuit adopted what has come to
be the most widely-accepted test for determining whether an individ-
ual has waived the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Under that test, a waiver may be found if
(1) the witness' prior statements have created a significant likelihood that the
finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the
truth; and (2) the witness had reason to know that his prior statements would
be interpreted as a waiver of the fifth amendments privilege against self-
incrimination. 2 7 5
Both prongs of this test must be established before a waiver will be
found.
The first prong of the Klein test has its roots in Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in United States v. St. Pierre.276
It must be conceded that the privilege is to suppress the truth, but that does
not mean that it is a privilege to garble it; although its exercise deprives the
parties of evidence, it should not furnish one side with what may be false evi-
271. Id. at 372-74 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896)).
272. In re Mudd, 95 B.R. 426, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
273. Illinois v. McCulloch (In re Master Key Litig.), 507 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1974).
See also United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1980); Shendal v.
United States, 312 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1963).
274. 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981).
275. Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981).
276. 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942).
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dence and deprive the other of any means of detecting the imposition. The
time for the witness to protect himself is when the decision is first presented
to him; he needs nothing more, and anything more puts a mischievous instru-
ment at his disposal.2 77
In other words,
[o]nce a witness testifies about an issue, the witness may not relate only part
of the story and decide to stop. Rather, the witness must fully disclose what
he started to recount and be amenable to cross-examination on the topic. Af-
ter the witness testifies, that witness may not claim the privilege because it
would lead to distortion of the facts. The court's concern is whether the prior
statements have "created a significant danger of distortion," because waiver of
the privilege should only be recognized in the "most compelling of
circumstances."2 7 8
Such compelling circumstances "do not exist unless a failure to find a
waiver would unduly prejudice" the other party to the proceeding.2 79
This would occur "if the finder of fact is left with misleading informa-
tion and likely to rely on that information."28 0
The importance of a finding of reliance upon the misleading infor-
mation is demonstrated in E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc. v. Jupiter Develop-
ment Corp.281 In that case, an individual filed an affidavit in support
of a third-party complaint. One of the other parties to the lawsuit ar-
gued that by submitting this affidavit, the afflant had waived his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court rejected
this argument and upheld the affiant's claim of privilege, reasoning
that because it had denied the motion to file the third-party complaint
as untimely, it had not relied upon the affidavit. Therefore, no party
had been prejudiced, even if the affidavit had created a distorted view
of the facts.
A similar result was reached, at least initially, in John P. Maguire
& Co. v. Sapir (In re Candor Diamond Corp).28 2 In that case, one of
the debtor's officers submitted an affidavit in support of her opposition
to an order to show cause. The officer briefly testified at a preliminary
hearing, but then refused to answer questions at an examination or-
dered by the court. The plaintiff moved to compel the officer's testi-
mony, arguing that she had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by
submitting the affidavit and testifying at the preliminary hearing. In
denying the plaintiffs motion, the court found that because it had en-
277. Id. at 840.
278. Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152, 163 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996)(citing United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir.
1942); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); Klein v. Harris, 667
F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)).
279. In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
280. Horowitz v. Sheldon (In re Donald Sheldon & Co.), 193 B.R. 152, 163 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996)(citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Jupiter Dev. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 110, 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
281. 91 F.R.D. 110, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
282. 21 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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tered default judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the underlying ad-
versary proceeding, it had not relied upon either the officer's affidavit
or her testimony. Under the circumstances, the court held that even if
the affidavit and testimony presented a distorted view of the facts, the
plaintiff had not been prejudiced, and the officer had not waived her
Fifth Amendment rights. When the default judgment was subse-
quently vacated on appeal, however, the court reached a different
conclusion.
The only reason why waiver of the privilege was not found in the prior deci-
sion of this Court was because the entry of a default judgment in the case had
vitiated any "significant likelihood that the court would be forced to rely upon
a distorted view of the truth". But with the vacating of the default judgment
and the reopening of the case, there is now significant likelihood of distortion
if the court is left with the witness's unchallenged and unsupported version of
the facts .... The opening of the default judgment... necessitates a finding
that the first prong of the Ilein test has been met.28 3
In In re Donald Sheldon & Co., Inc.,28 4 the Chapter 7 trustee ob-
tained a judgment against Donald Sheldon, the debtor's principal, and
scheduled a deposition in an attempt to discover assets against which
he might levy. At the deposition, Sheldon answered either "I don't
know" or "I don't recall" to most of the trustee's questions. The deposi-
tion was continued, and at the continued deposition, Mr. Sheldon as-
serted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In
rejecting the trustee's argument that Sheldon's testimony at the ini-
tial deposition constituted a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights,
the bankruptcy court noted that
[t]he Trustee concedes that he has not relied on Mr. Sheldon's testimony. The
Trustee states that Mr. Sheldon "has told us nothing." The invocation of the
privilege, after Mr. Sheldon's initial testimony, leaves the Trustee in the same
position as prior to that testimony. Thus, given the content of that prior testi-
mony, the Trustee is not now prejudiced by Mr. Sheldon's decision to avail
himself of the privilege. While eliciting the information would be useful in the
Trustee's efforts to locate assets, he has not been prejudiced because Mr. Shel-
don's vague statements added nothing new. 28 5
Finding no distortion, the court concluded that the proceeding was "in
the same posture as if Mr. Sheldon had initially invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege"28 6 and upheld the claim of privilege.28 7
283. John P. Maguire & Co. v. Magolies (In re Candor Diamond Corp.), 42 B.R. 916,
920 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
284. 193 B.R. 152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
285. Id. at 164 (citation omitted).
286. Id. at 165.
287. One other aspect of the Horowitz case bears mentioning. In response to the prin-
cipal's argument that because there was no case or controversy, there was no
finder of fact, the bankruptcy court ruled that
[flor the narrow purposes of the deposition, which is a proceeding to as-
certain the location of [the principal's] assets, this Court holds that the
Trustee is the finder of fact. The proceeding is not an ordinary investiga-
tion. Rather, it is a deposition conducted under oath pursuant to a fed-
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The second prong of the Klein test is established if an individual's
prior statement was both testimonial, "that is, voluntarily made under
oath in the same proceeding,"28 and incriminating.28 9 The require-
ment that the prior statement be made in the same proceeding is of
particular importance to bankruptcy practitioners because of the pos-
sibility that a single bankruptcy case may involve a number of
proceedings.
The jurisdictional statutes promulgated by Congress... make a distinction
between the terms "case" and "proceeding." Many proceedings may be
brought within a single... case .... A separate adversary proceeding would
relate to but would not necessarily be the same "proceeding" as the § 341
meeting governing the administration of the case. Consequently, the waiver
concept may not apply in serial proceedings in a bankruptcy case.
2 9 0
Thus, a debtor's testimony at a deposition taken in connection with
one adversary proceeding might constitute a waiver of her Fifth
Amendment rights in that adversary proceeding, but she still would
be permitted to claim the privilege against self-incrimination in a sep-
arate adversary proceeding.
It could be argued, however, that a contested matter, an adversary
proceeding, or any other event that transpires in a bankruptcy case
should be considered a part of the larger "bankruptcy proceeding." In
that event, a waiver at any stage of the case would bar the later asser-
tion of the privilege. Under the circumstances, and given the conse-
quences of a finding of waiver, counsel would be well-advised to
instruct their clients to assert the privilege at the earliest opportunity.
The requirement that the prior statement be incriminating is satis-
fied if the prior statement "might provide a clue leading investigators
to discover facts that could constitute links in a chain of circumstan-
tial evidence proving the invoker's criminal conduct."29 1 This is the
same standard used by the courts to determine whether an answer is
incriminating when an individual invokes the Fifth Amendment.292
One therefore might expect that if an individual could have success-
fully invoked the Fifth Amendment before testifying previously, but
did not, the second prong of the Klein test would be established.
In In re Hulon,293 however, the bankruptcy court focused on the
Klein court's use of the phrase "had reason to know" and found that
because most of the debtor's testimony at the § 341 meeting of credi-
eral rule. This Court finds it untenable that in a proceeding conducted
under oath there could be no circumstances under which the privilege
would be waived.
Id. at 164.
288. Id. at 163.
289. Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 288 (2d Cir. 1981).
290. In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
291. Id.
292. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
293. 92 B.R. 670 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
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tors had been elicited by her own attorney, she had no reason to know
that her answers might be incriminating.
Courts expect and encourage debtors to be represented by attorneys. If a
debtor stands in open court and knowingly and intelligently forfeits rights and
privileges, a court may hold the debtor responsible for the consequences. But
if the complexity of the law forces a person to speak through an attorney, the
ability of the attorney to waive the rights of the person should be extremely
limited. Here, the debtor could not have expected that responding to her own
lawyer's questions would amount to a waiver of her fifth amendment
privilege. 294
The court's finding appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Garner that a waiver need not be knowing and in-
telligent. On the other hand, it simply may represent the court's at-
tempt to give the debtor every benefit of the doubt in applying the
second prong of the Klein test.2 95
Even if it is not waived, the privilege against self-incrimination
may not prove to be the panacea sought by the individual invoking it.
In civil cases, the court is permitted to draw an adverse inference
against such an individual. The possible consequences of such an ad-
verse inference therefore should always be considered before invoking
the privilege.
VIII. ADVERSE INFERENCE
While the Fifth Amendment permits an individual to refuse to tes-
tify, a debtor's "refusal to testify may not be transformed into an as-
sertion of innocence." 29 6 To the contrary, the Supreme Court held in
Baxter v. Palmigiano29 7 that "the prevailing rule [is that] the Fifth
Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil
actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence
offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference
where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause." 2 98 Thus,
bankruptcy courts may draw an "adverse inference" from an individ-
ual's silence following a claim of privilege.299
294. Id. at 675.
295. The court could have avoided the issue altogether by finding that the § 341 meet-
ing of creditors, at which the prior testimony was given, and the Rule 2004 exam-
ination, at which the privilege was asserted, were separate proceedings (the court
assumed, apparently for the sake of argument, that they were part of the same
proceeding) or by deciding the matter based on its finding that the Chapter 7
trustee had not demonstrated that the debtor's responses at the § 341 meeting
were incriminating. See id. at 674.
296. Raymond James & Assoc. v. Metzgar (In re Metzgar), 127 B.R. 708, 711 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1991)(citing Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Salzman (In re Salzman), 61 B.R.
878, 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
297. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
298. Id. at 318 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 439 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
299. See, e.g., Grossman v. Murray (In re Murray), 162 B.R. 384 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1993); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bartlett (In re Bartlett), 154 B.R. 827
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Such an adverse inference "is permitted where [an individual] as-
serts his privilege on matters peculiarly within his knowledge and
where there is independent evidence supporting the adverse fact being
inferred"300 and may be drawn at either the summary judgment stage
or trial.3 0 Yet, an adverse inference has no per se effect.
Baxter [v. Palm4giano] did no more than permit an inference to be drawn in a
civil case from a party's refusal to testify. Respondent's silence in Baxter was
only one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assess-
ing a penalty, and was given no more probative value than the facts of the
case warranted .... 302
A party asking a bankruptcy court to draw an adverse inference from
an individual's silence must still prove up its case.
A plaintiff seeking to rely on a Fifth Amendment inference must first offer
evidence which at least tends to prove each part of the plaintiff's case. Once
that has been done, the Court can then add to the weight of the other evidence
by use ofthe inference. However, the invocation ofthe Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to constitute probative proof of
a plaintiffs case. If a plaintiff offers no evidence of fraud.., the inference
drawn from invocation of the Fifth Amendment does not by itself establish
fraud.3 0 3
For example, in Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Mart (In re
Mart),3 0 4 a creditor objected to the debtor's discharge, arguing in part
that the bankruptcy court should draw an adverse inference from the
fact the debtor had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination.
In particular, the creditor asked the court to infer that the debtor had
"guilty knowledge" of the wrongful diversion, transfer, and conceal-
ment of certain funds. As there was little, if any, other evidence of
such knowledge on the part of the debtor, the court found in the
debtor's favor.
In In re Caucus Distributors Inc.,3 0 5 the United States filed invol-
untary petitions against three related debtors. Having no direct evi-
dence of the debtors' financial condition at the time the petitions were
filed, the government urged the bankruptcy court to infer that the
debtors were not paying their debts when due, based upon the debtors'
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1993); Charter Fed. Say. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140
B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); Raymond James & Assoc. v. Metzgar (In re Metz-
gar), 127 B.R. 708 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); Marine Midland Bank, NA_ v. Endres
(In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
300. Erie Materials, Inc. v. Oot (In re Oot), 112 B.R. 497, 501 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989)(citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318; Machado v. Commanding
Officer, 860 F.2d 542, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1988)).
301. Young Sik Woo v. Glantz, 99 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1983).
302. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977).
303. Trastmark Nat'l Bank v. Curtis (In re Curtis), 177 B.R. 717, 720 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala. 1995).
304. 90 B.R. 547 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
305. 106 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
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representatives' invocation of the Fifth Amendment. This the court
declined to do.
While this Court is aware that the drawing of negative inferences is appropri-
ate under certain circumstances, it is unwilling and without authority to infer
beyond what the independent evidence establishes. In view of the govern-
ment's inability to proffer direct and timely evidence pertaining to the debtors'
financial status, or "independent" evidence enabling this Court to draw "infer-
ences" against the debtors in view of their invocation of the Fifth Amendment,
we find that the government has failed to establish that the debtors generally
were not paying their debts as they became due as of... the date the petitions
were filed. 3 0 6
Clearly, the party seeking to rely upon the adverse inference has to
make some affirmative showing, however slight, to support its posi-
tion. It cannot rely exclusively upon the failure to testify.
In United States v. Stelweck (In re Stelweck),307 the government
filed adversary complaints against the debtors in two related Chapter
7 cases, alleging that the debtors submitted fraudulent claims for re-
imbursement to Medicare, and asking the bankruptcy court to except
the debtors' obligations to it from discharge. 308 At trial, the govern-
ment was able to establish to the bankruptcy court's satisfaction three
of the five elements of its case: the debtors made representations; the
government relied on those representations; and, assuming all four of
the other elements were established, the government sustained dam-
ages as a proximate result of those representations. But, the govern-
ment was unable to produce direct evidence that the debtors'
representations were in fact false or that such representations were
made with the intent of deceiving the government. The court declined
"to draw the adverse inferences from the [debtors'] invocation of their
Fifth Amendment rights to fill in the gaps in [the government's]
case."
3 0 9
Absent substantial and compelling independent evidence of the required ele-
ments of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), it would be inappropriate to allow a
plaintiff to establish such fraud simply by the fact that a defendant invoked
the Fifth Amendment. If the court adopted such reasoning, we would be en-
dangering the right of a debtor who invoked his or her Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege to a discharge in bankruptcy. We believe such a position would be both
unwise and would unduly penalize a debtor for invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. 3 1
0
Once a party establishes a prima facie case, the effect of an adverse
inference is to shift the burden of producing evidence to the individual
306. Id. at 922 (citations omitted).
307. 86 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
308. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
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invoking the Fifth Amendment.3 1 1 If that individual remains silent in
the face of the facts established by the other party, the bankruptcy
court may then infer that she is unable to deny the other party's
allegations.3 12
In Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Salzman (In re Salzman),3 13 the debt-
ors guaranteed an obligation of the corporation of which they were the
principal shareholders and officers to the plaintiff. This obligation
was secured by an assignment of the corporation's accounts receiva-
ble. In its complaint, which sought to except from discharge its claims
against the debtors, the plaintiff alleged that the debtors, on behalf of
the corporation, had submitted to it false invoices for uncompleted
work and forged bills of lading for unshipped merchandise. At trial,
the plaintiff established to the bankruptcy court's satisfaction that the
debtors knew or should have known whether the invoices and bills of
lading were legitimate. Because this evidence was not rebutted due to
the debtors' invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the court drew an ad-
verse inference that the debtors could not rebut the plaintiffs evidence
and ruled in the plaintiffs favor.
Significantly, the issue as to the debtors' intent to defraud can best be negated
by the debtors themselves, since their state of mind is in issue .... [Wihen a
debtor refuses to testify in response to probative evidence offered against him
•.. it is proper for the Bankruptcy Court to draw adverse inferences from his
invocation against self-incrimination. Not only has the plaintiff established a
prima facie case that the debtors submitted fictitious invoices which they rep-
resented to be bona fide, so that the burden of producing evidence shifted to
the debtors to show that they did not intend to deceive the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff has also established by clear and convincing evidence that the debt-
ors' actions were intended to, and did, deceive the plaintiff.3 1 4
In Erie Materials, Inc. v. Oot (In re 0ot),315 the debtor was a gen-
eral contractor who contracted with two homeowners to replace a
number of windows in their home. The debtor purchased the windows
from the plaintiff, installed them, and accepted payment from the
homeowners, but did not pay the plaintiff for the windows. When the
debtor subsequently filed bankruptcy, the plaintiff filed an adversary
complaint, seeking a determination that its claim against the debtor
was nondischargeable due to the debtor's fraud or defalcation while
acting as a fiduciary.316 At trial, the plaintiff offered the following evi-
dence: its invoices, which were signed by the debtor to acknowledge
receipt of the windows, to prove the debtor purchased the windows
311. See Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Salzman (In re Salzman), 61 B.R. 878, 890 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986).
312. See Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1986).
313. 61 B.R. 878, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
314. Id. at 890-91 (citations omitted).
315. 112 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
316. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994).
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from it; the testimony of one of the homeowners and a receipt for pay-
ment in full, signed by the debtor, to prove that the homeowners paid
the debtor; and the testimony of its treasurer, to prove the amount
owed to the plaintiff for the windows. Plaintiff was unable to offer
direct evidence of the debtor's actual diversion of the funds because
when the debtor was called to testify and to identify the ledger for the
project, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to tes-
tify. As a result, the ledger was not admitted into evidence. Under
New York law, however, a contractor is required to maintain a record
of all payments received in trust for a materialman.317 The plaintiff
therefore argued that the court could draw an adverse inference that
the ledger would establish the debtor's diversion of the funds from the
debtor's invocation of the privilege. The court agreed and found the
claim to be nondischargeable.
The information in the alleged ledger documents which was protected by
Debtor's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege, here, is exclusively
within the Debtor's knowledge, however, uncontroverted testimonial angd doc-
umentary evidence exists independently of Debtor's alleged ledgers which
warrant the inference of diversion. Thus, while the Debtor is permitted to
assert his privilege as a protective shield, he is not also allowed to convert it
into a sword to strike out an inference warranted by the circumstances
here.3 1 8
In Hazelip v. Horridge (In re Horridge),31 9 two creditors objected to
the debtors' discharge on the ground that the debtors had failed to
explain satisfactorily a loss of assets. In support of their motion for
summary judgment, the creditors offered a financial statement signed
by the debtors fewer than than eighteen months prior to the filing of
their petition and schedules. The financial statement showed total as-
sets of nearly $3.6 million; the schedules showed assets of only
$41,004. Rather than offer any explanation for the apparent loss of
$3.5 million over a seventeen-month period, the debtors claimed the
Fifth Amendment and refused to testify. The court agreed with the
creditors that it could draw an adverse inference from the debtors' re-
fusal to testify.
Plaintiffs must make aprima facie case by showing [the debtors] had a sudden
and drastic loss of assets just prior to the filing of bankruptcy. The financial
statement ... and the [schedules] presented by Plaintiffs have satisfied this
requirement. Accordingly, the burden of going forward with the evidence to
explain satisfactorily any loss of assets shifted to [the debtors]. [The debtors]
have failed to provide any explanation as to their severe reduction in
assets.
3 2 0
317. See N.Y. LIEN LAW art. 3-A (McKinney 1989).
318. Erie Materials, Inc. v. Oot (In re Oot), 112 B.R. 497, 501 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1989)(citing United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988)).
319. 127 B.R. 798 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
320. Id. 798-99 (citation omitted).
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Having drawn such an inference, the court granted the creditors' mo-
tion for summary judgment and denied the debtors a discharge.3 21
The possibility that the court might draw an adverse inference
from a debtor's silence is not the only possible negative consequence of
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Some of the other
possible negative consequences are explored in the next Part.
IX. OTHER NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
The Supreme Court has long held that an individual who properly
invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
may not be punished for doing so. "[A] State may not impose substan-
tial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amend-
ment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself."322
Nevertheless, "the courts have never held that a Fifth Amendment
claimant in a civil proceeding must be shielded from all possible nega-
tive consequences that may attend his invocation of the privilege."3 23
An adverse inference drawn from an individual's silence is an example
of one such "negative consequence."
The difference between a prohibited punishment and a permitted
negative consequence is often very slight. Perhaps the best explana-
tion of that difference is the one offered by the court in In re Moses.3 24
Under the Lefkowitz [v. Cunningham3 25] line [of cases prohibiting punishing
the individual claiming the privilege], the penalty was imposed either to pun-
ish the claimant or to compel testimony, or both. Under the Baxter [v.
Palmigiano32 6] line [of cases permitting the individual claiming the privilege
to suffer negative consequences], however, the penalty was imposed either to
facilitate the proceeding or to make it more equitable for the non-invoking
party ...
321. A bankruptcy court may be more likely to draw an adverse inference in certain
cases than in others. One example of such a case is when a Chapter 11 or Chap-
ter 12 debtor in possession invokes the privilege against self-incrimination in re-
sponse to a creditor's motion to remove the debtor in possession for fraud or
mismanagement, which seems inherently inconsistent with the debtor in posses-
sion's fiduciary duties.
322. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977). See also Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973)(finding a violation of Fifth Amendment to cancel ar-
chitects' contracts with the state because of their refusal to testify); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968)(finding a violation to discharge a policeman be-
cause of his refusal to waive his privilege); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967)(finding a violation to coerce statements from a policeman under the threat
of discharge); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)(finding a violation to disbar
an attorney because of his refusal to testify or produce documents in connection
with a disciplinary proceeding).
323. In re Moses, 792 F. Supp. 529, 536 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
324. Id.
325. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
326. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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The core distinction between the two lines of cases, then, is the motivation
behind the cost imposed on the claimant. A negative consequence may not be
used solely to punish a claimant for having invoked his privilege. It may,
however, be used to compensate the non-invoking party or to better adminis-
ter the proceeding.3 27
In the context of a bankruptcy case, one such possible negative con-
sequence of claiming the privilege is the dismissal of the case.3 23 In
Moses, the debtor refused to testify regarding certain assets. The
bankruptcy court denied a creditor's motion to dismiss, declining to
follow whatever authority might suggest that a debtor's refusal to tes-
tify was a ground for dismissal. On appeal, the district court analyzed
both the Lefkowitz and Baxter line of cases and determined that under
the appropriate circumstances, dismissal was necessary to ensure the
effective administration of bankruptcy cases. Preservation of the
debtor's constitutional rights and facilitation of the statutory policies
of the bankruptcy laws
can be accomplished in this case by remanding this matter to the bankruptcy
court for a determination as to whether the information withheld by the
Debtor pursuant to her Fifth Amendment privilege has, in fact, precluded a
fair and effective administration of the estate. If it has, on remand, the
Debtor's refusal to testify may lead the bankruptcy court to dismiss without
prejudice the Debtor's bankruptcy petition. However, such an action would be
taken not to punish the Debtor but to balance the invocation of the privilege
against the need for adequate disclosure to the Trustee and creditors. Such a
result would not only be more fair to the Trustee and creditors, it would also
facilitate the proceeding in that when the bankruptcy court eventually ruled
on the discharge, it would do so with the benefit of the full mix of available
information.3 29
The court then remanded the matter to the bankruptcy court to make
a factual determination as to whether the debtor's refusal to testify
had prevented the trustee from carrying out his statutory duties.3 30
Another possible negative consequence is the denial of the debtor's
discharge. 33 1 The debtor may not be denied a discharge solely be-
cause he invokes the Fifth Amendment. 3 32 A debtor may be denied a
327. In re Moses, 792 F. Supp. 529, 537-38 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
328. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1994), amended by 100 Stat. 3100; id. § 1112, amended by
100 Stat. 3102; id. § 1208, repealed by 100 Stat. 3121; id. § 1307, amended by 100
Stat. 3103, 100 Stat. 3114. The enumerated grounds for dismissal are not ex-
haustive. See id. § 102(3).
329. In re Moses, 792 F. Supp. 529, 538 (E.D. Mich 1992).
330. Cf. Mellon Bank v. Fekos (In re Fekos), 148 B.R. 10 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992)(deny-
ing a creditor's motion to dismiss for failure to explain how the debtor's refusal to
testify made it impossible for the bankruptcy estate to be administered).
331. One court has noted, correctly it would seem, that the denial of the debtor's dis-
charge is in fact a more serious consequence than dismissal of the debtor's case.
See In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 447 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1986).
332. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (1994). See also Torcie v. Ruff (In re Grower's Packing
Co., Inc.), 150 B.R. 82, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)(finding that the debtor's use of
his Fifth Amendment privilege should not be the sole basis for denial of dis-
charge); In re Potter, 88 B.R. 843, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)(holding that Con-
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discharge, however, if after being granted immunity or being ordered
to testify following a determination by the court that he improperly
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, he continues to re-
fuse to testify.33 3
In addition, several of the grounds for denying a debtor a discharge
involve matters about which a debtor might not wish to testify for fear
of incriminating himself.334 If the trustee or a creditor establishes a
prima facie case, and the debtor chooses to remain silent, the court
may draw an adverse inference from the debtor's silence and deny the
debtor a discharge.
For example, a debtor can be denied a discharge for concealing,
destroying, mutilating, falsifying, or failing to keep or preserve
records from which the debtor's financial condition might be ascer-
tained.3 35 Thus, in Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v. Frenville,3 36 the
debtor was denied a discharge, not because he invoked the Fifth
Amendment, but because by doing so he failed to rebut the plaintiffs
allegations that, among other wrongful acts, he had destroyed or with-
held records.
A debtor also can be denied a discharge for failing to explain satis-
factorily a loss of assets.33 7 This was the case in In re Horridge338 and
In re Simmons,33 9 in which the debtors were denied discharges, again
not because they invoked the Fifth Amendment, but because by re-
maining silent in the face of the plaintiffs' evidence of a significant loss
of assets, they offered the court no explanation-much less a satisfac-
tory explanation-of such loss. 34 0
Finally, a debtor can be denied a discharge for transferring, remov-
ing, destroying, mutilating, or concealing property of the debtor or
property of the estate, or permitting such property to be transferred,
removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed; making a false oath or
account; presenting or using a false claim; giving, offering, receiving,
or attempting to obtain money, property, or advantage or a promise of
money, property, or advantage; acting or forbearing to act; or for with-
holding from an officer of the estate entitled to possession of them any
gress intended to protect against self-incrimination without a penalty in
bankruptcy).
333. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5)(B), (C) (1994). See Torcie v. Ruff (In re Grower's Packing
Co., Inc.), 150 B.R. 82, 84 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
334. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1994).
335. Id. § 727(a)(3).
336. 67 B.R. 858 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
337. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) (1994).
338. 127 B.R. 798 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
339. 113 B.R. 741 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
340. But see In re Potter, 88 B.R. 843, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)(reading § 727(a)(5)
and § 727(a)(6) together to require finding the valid assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment to be a 'satisfactory explanation" under § 727(a)(5)).
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books, documents, records, or papers relating to the debtor's property
of financial affairs. 34 1 Under the rationale of Frenville, Horridge,
Simmons, and similar cases, a debtor who chooses to invoke her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than testify in
rebuttal of a trustee's or a creditor's evidence of any such conduct,
could be denied a discharge.
A third possible negative consequence of invoking the Fifth
Amendment is the determination that a particular creditor's claim
against the debtor is nondischargeable. As is the case with several of
the grounds for denying a debtor a discharge, many of the grounds for
finding a particular debt to be nondischargeable involve matters about
which a debtor's testimony might prove to be self-incriminating.342
For example, a debt for money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit can be found to be nondischargeable
to the extent it was obtained by false pretenses, a false representation,
actual fraud, or a materially false written statement regarding the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition.34 3 In Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A. v. Frenville,344 three creditors pled essentially all these
grounds in their complaint to determine the dischargeability of their
claims against the debtors. After the debtor invoked the Fifth Amend-
ment, the creditors moved for summary judgment, filing "extensive af-
fidavits by corporate officers setting forth a scheme of fraud and
deception in support of each of the allegations of the complaint."34 5
While the bankruptcy court chose not to review the details of the alle-
gations in its opinion, it found that the creditors had established a
prima facie case for nondischargeability. Drawing from the debtors'
refusal to testify an inference that they were unable to deny the credi-
tors' allegations, the court then held that the creditors' claims were
nondischargeable.
341. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), (a)(4) (1994).
342. See id. § 523(a). The absence in § 523(a) of a provision comparable to that found
in § 727(a)(6) has led some bankruptcy courts to conclude that a debtor cannot
raise the Fifth Amendment in response to a nondischargeability complaint. See,
e.g., Charter Fed. Say. Ass'n v. Rezak (In re Lederman), 140 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992)("Congress specifically preserved a debtor's rights to raise the
privilege against self-incrimination, absent a grant of immunity, with respect to
oral examination and testimony without prejudice to the right to a discharge.
The lack of a similar provision in § 523 leads to the inescapable conclusion that
none was intended."); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986)("[Ilt is clear that Congress did not authorize the use of the
privilege with respect to a claim concerning the dischargeability of a specific debt.
Nowhere in 11 U.S.C. § 523 does the privilege arise.").
343. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1994).
344. 67 B.R. 858 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
345. Id. at 859.
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A debt for fiduciary fraud or defalcation, embezzlement, or larceny
can also be found to be nondischargeable.3 46 In Erie Materials, Inc. v.
Oot (In re Oot),347 the plaintiff, a materialman, supplied materials for
a project on which the debtor was the general contractor. The plaintiff
alleged that the debtor's failure to pay for the materials amounted to
fiduciary fraud or defalcation and that its claim against the debtor
should therefore be excepted from the debtor's discharge. After first
determining that under New York law payments received by a general
contractor for a project are held in trust for the benefit of a material-
man who supplies materials for the project, the bankruptcy court drew
from the debtor's silence following his invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment the inference that the payments he had received but not paid
over to the plaintiff had been wrongfully diverted. The court then
found that this constituted a defalcation and held that the plaintiffs
claim was nondischargeable.
A debt for willful and malicious injury to another or to another's
property can also be found to be nondischargeable. 3 48 In General Mo-
tors Acceptance Corp. v. Bartlett (In re Bartlett),349 a creditor sought a
determination of nondischargeability of its claim, which arose out of a
"floor plan" financing arrangement between the creditor and the
debtor's car dealership. The creditor alleged that the debtor caused
the dealership to retain sale proceeds that should have been paid over
to the creditor and used funds intended for the purchase of new cars
for other purposes. The creditor argued this amounted to, among
other things, a willful and malicious injury. In response, the debtor
invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to comply with the credi-
tor's discovery requests. After the bankruptcy court denied the credi-
tor's motion for summary judgment, the creditor filed a motion to
compel, which the court granted.3 50 When the debtor persisted in re-
fusing to comply with the discovery requests, the creditor brought a
motion for default judgment, which the court also granted.
[A] voluntary Chapter 7 debtor is required to produce documents necessary to
the trial of an objection to the discharge of a particular debt.... notwithstand-
ing any incidental incriminating effect of such production, if said debtor
wishes to pursue and obtain the discharge of the debt in question by virtue of
his bankruptcy filing. The debtor was present at the hearing on the motion for
entry of default judgment. Through counsel, the debtor stated that if he has
to produce the documents to avoid having default judgment entered against
him he still will refuse to produce by invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Accordingly, and since no purpose would be served by any further delay in
346. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994).
347. 112 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
348. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994).
349. 162 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993).
350. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bartlett (In re Bartlett), 154 B.R. 827
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1993).
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resolving this adversary proceeding, a default judgment [will be
entered] .351
Finally, a debt arising out of a death or personal injury caused by a
debtor's unlawful operation of a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol, drugs, or other substance also can be found to be non-
dischargeable. 35 2 Given the holdings in Frenville, Oot, Bartlett, and
other like cases, if a debtor invokes the Fifth Amendment and leaves
unrebutted a creditor's prima facie case, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that a bankruptcy court would except such a debt from the
debtor's discharge.
Another possible negative consequence of a valid claim of privilege
is the denial of confirmation of a debtor's plan of reorganization. In
Chapters 11, 12, and 13, the bankruptcy court may confirm a debtor's
plan only if a number of requirements are met.3 53 One such require-
ment is that the plan be proposed in good faith.354
In In re McCormick,3 55 the bankruptcy court denied confirmation
of the debtor's Chapter 11 plan, finding that the debtor's refusal on
Fifth Amendment grounds to testify at a deposition in a nondis-
chargeability action demonstrated that his plan had not been filed in
good faith. The district court affirmed without opinion. On appeal
from that decision, however, the circuit court found that the totality of
the circumstances in the case negated any inference of bad faith that
might be drawn from the debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
The debtor had complied with all financial and disclosure require-
ments; he had timely filed his schedules and statement of financial
affairs; he had testified at his § 341 meeting of creditors; the bank-
ruptcy court had approved his disclosure statement; and the necessary
number of creditors had voted in favor of his plan. Under the circum-
stances, the court held that the debtor's refusal to testify, standing
alone, was insufficient evidence of bad faith.
The Bankruptcy Code does not dictate nor have we found any other court to
have held that a bankruptcy court may deny confirmation of a reorganization
plan solely because the debtor refused to testify on the basis of the privilege
against self-incrimination in a related proceeding during the pendency of a
Chapter 11 case .... As long as [the debtor's] failure to testify at the[ credi-
tor's] deposition did not impede the basic bankruptcy administration of his
case,... assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege alone cannot be the basis
for denying confirmation of his plan.3 56
351. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bartlett (In re Bartlett), 162 B.R. 73, 79
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1993).
352. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (1994).
353. See id. §§ 1129(a), 1225(a), 1325(a).
354. Id. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1225(a)(3), 1325(a)(3).
355. 49 F.3d 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).
356. Id. at 1526-27.
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Nonetheless, the court specifically left open the possibility that a
debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment might support a denial of
confirmation.
It may well be that the bankruptcy court may have denied [the debtor's] con-
firmation for reasons additional to his refusal to testify in the [creditor's] depo-
sition, or that his refusal impeded the administration of the Chapter 11 plan
in a way not disclosed by this record. If so, that issue may be addressed on
remand. 35 7
Yet another possible negative consequence is the striking of evi-
dence offered by the individual invoking the Fifth Amendment. As
noted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Edmond,358
courts have struck an individual's testimony for invoking the Fifth
Amendment and refusing to testify on cross-examination.3 5 9 In Ed-
mond, however, the evidence at issue was an affidavit offered by the
debtor in support of his motion for summary judgment in a nondis-
chargeability action brought against him. The plaintiff objected to the
affidavit, alleging that by asserting the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation throughout the discovery process, the debtor had prevented the
plaintiff from responding appropriately to the motion. The bank-
ruptcy court agreed with the plaintiff, struck the debtor's affidavit,
and denied the motion for summary judgment. On appeal, both the
district court and the circuit court affirmed the bankruptcy court's de-
cision to strike the affidavit. "By selectively asserting his Fifth
Amendment privilege, [the debtor] attempted to insure that his un-
questioned, unverified affidavit would be the only version. But the
Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be invoked as a shield to oppose
depositions while discarding it for the limited purpose of making
statements to support a summary judgment motion."36 0
With few exceptions, the foregoing negative consequences have
been suffered by individuals who properly invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination. Individuals who improperly invoke the
Fifth Amendment are also subject to negative consequences. For ex-
ample, an individual may be held in contempt if she refuses to testify
after being ordered to do so by the bankruptcy court.36 1 In addition,
357. Id. at 1527.
358. 934 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1991).
359. See, e.g., Lawson v. Murray, 837 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1988)(striking direct testi-
mony); United States v. Baker, 721 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1983)(disregarding direct
testimony); United States v. Sack, 118 F.R.D. 500 (D. Neb. 1987)(holding that a
witness must choose between asserting the Fifth Amendment and losing, or an-
swering questions and risking a possible grand jury investigation).
360. In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308 (4th Cir. 1991). See also United States v.
Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990). "Selective assertion" of the privi-
lege may also raise a question of waiver.
361. See FED. R. B AKmE P. 9020. See also Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,
370 (1966)(f[C]ourts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful
orders through civil contempt."); In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
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while an individual should not be held in contempt for refusing to an-
swer questions following a valid assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination,3 6 2 her continued silence after she is granted immunity
may result in that sanction.
The statute and the legislative history indicate that a debtor may be denied a
discharge as a result of his failure to testify only when he continues to refuse
to testify after a grant of immunity. It does not indicate that denial of the
debtor's discharge is the exclusive penalty for failure to testify despite immu-
nity. Furthermore, if the denial of discharge were the only penalty for refus-
ing to testify, then a witness other than the debtor granted immunity under
section 344 would have no incentive to testify. Obviously, this is not what
Congress intended by section 727(a)(6)(B). 3 63
If the court determines, for whatever reason, that an individual's
conduct in refusing to testify does not amount to contempt, it still may
impose other sanctions. For example, in In re Hulon,364 the bank-
ruptcy court did not find it was appropriate to hold the debtor in con-
tempt for refusing to testify at a Rule 2004 examination ordered by
the court.
[The order [requiring the debtor to submit to the Rule 2004 examination] ...
was agreed to by the attorney then representing the debtor. Apparently, the
criminal attorney representing the debtor would have objected to the exami-
nation and the court would have had a contested hearing to determine the
appropriateness of the order. The court determines that the debtor's conduct
does not constitute contempt in the circumstances of this case.365
The court nevertheless ordered the debtor to pay the trustee $1350,
representing the fees and expenses he had incurred in connection with
the Rule 2004 examination.
Finally, an individual who improperly invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment in connection with a request for discovery may be sanctioned in
the manner provided for a failure to comply with an order compelling
discovery.3 6 6 A bankruptcy court may sanction such a failure by con-
sidering designated facts to be established for the purposes of the un-
derlying adversary proceeding; refusing to allow opposition to, or
1988)(-The court has the power, under 11 U.S.C. § 105 and Bankruptcy Rule
9020, to hear and determine a request for contempt emanating from the violation
of one of its orders in a core proceeding.").
362. In re Jacques, 115 B.R. 272, 273-74 (D. Nev. 1990).
363. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir.
1984)(footnotes omitted).
364. 92 B.R. 670 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
365. Id. at 676.
366. See Marine Midland Bank, N-A. v. Endres (In re Endres), 103 B.R. 49 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1989)(declining to enter a default judgment against a debtor invoking
the Fifth Amendment because to do so would be "disproportionate to the failure
... given the lack of proof on willfulness, bad faith, history of dilatory conduct or
prejudice to the plaintiff, the availability of lesser sanctions and the constitu-
tional stature of the privilege asserted," but staying further proceedings in the
underlying adversary proceeding pending the debtor's compliance with the
court's discovery order).
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support of, designated claims or defenses; prohibiting the introduction
of designated matters into evidence; striking pleadings or portions of
pleadings; staying further proceedings; dismissing the action or part
of the action; entering default judgment; and awarding attorney's fees
and expenses.3 6 7
In light of the myriad potential consequences of invoking the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, an individual involved in parallel
bankruptcy and criminal proceedings obviously faces some difficult de-
cisions. The burden placed on such an individual may be reduced or
eliminated if the bankruptcy proceeding is stayed pending the out-
come of the criminal proceeding. The limited situations in which this
may be appropriate are discussed below.
M. STAY OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
It is generally accepted that a bankruptcy court cannot enjoin a
federal district court from trying a criminal case against a debtor.3 68
In what appears to be the only published decision involving a bank-
ruptcy court's attempt to do so, the bankruptcy court's decision was
rapidly reversed on appeal.3 69 Consequently, the question of whether
a threat of criminal prosecution warrants the imposition of a stay to
protect the debtor's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is answered in the context of a stay of a bankruptcy
proceeding. 3 70
A complete stay of all bankruptcy proceedings pending the outcome
of a related criminal case is an extraordinary remedy.371 The propri-
ety of issuing such a stay has been addressed by a number of bank-
ruptcy courts. In In re Hale,372 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that no authority supported the argument that a "bank-
ruptcy court is compelled to grant a stay of proceedings, when [a
debtor's] testimony constitutes an election between protecting civil in-
terests in a bankruptcy proceeding and safeguarding [constitutional]
367. See FED. R. BANK.P P. 7037 (applying FED. R. Crv. P. 37 in adversary proceed-
ings). The list of possible sanctions in Rule 37 is not exhaustive. The court is
permitted to enter any order it deems just. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
368. See Lower Brule Constr. Co. v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 84 B.R.
638 (D.S.D. 1988)(holding that a bankruptcy court cannot enjoin a district court).
But see In re Lion Capital Group, 44 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)(staying civil
actions brought in district court).
369. United States v. Air Fla. Inc., 48 B.R. 749 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
370. The question of whether a bankruptcy court may stay state court criminal pro-
ceedings is not discussed in this Article. For further reading on this issue, see
Craig Peyton Gaumer, Curbing an Expropriation of Power: The Argument
Against Allowing Bankruptcy Courts to Enjoin State Criminal Proceedings, 16
AA. BANsm. INsT. J. 12 (1997).
371. In re Piperi, 137 B.R. 644, 646-47 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991)(citing Well v. Marko-
witz, 829 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
372. 980 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992).
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rights in a criminal action."373 Thus, it is left to the discretion of the
bankruptcy court to decide whether the party requesting a stay has
met its burden of showing that it is entitled to injunctive relief.3 74
Some courts appear reluctant to grant such a stay if the debtor has not
been indicted and the United States is not a party to the bankruptcy
proceeding.375
Most motions to stay bankruptcy proceedings are filed by the
debtor. In In re Ahead By A Length, Inc.,3 76 however, an involuntary
Chapter 7 case, the United States requested the stay. In that case,
the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary proceeding to avoid certain
prepetition fraudulent transfers that allegedly were part of a conspir-
acy between three "businessmen" to deprive the debtor of property.
Prior to the filing of that adversary proceeding, the U.S. Attorney be-
gan a criminal investigation into the activities of Irwin Feiner, one of
the conspirators, which ultimately led to his entering into a plea
agreement that called for his "continued cooperation with the Internal
Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attor-
ney."3 7 7 Feiner was then convicted of "conspiracy to defraud the
United States of corporate income tax, personal income tax evasion
and wire fraud."378
The remaining conspirators were subsequently indicted for aiding
and abetting tax evasion and other federal offenses. When they at-
tempted to depose Feiner in the trustee's adversary proceeding, "he
pleaded his Fifth Amendment privilege against [self-incrimination] in
response to virtually every question."3 79 The two coconspirators then
filed a motion to compel. In response, the U.S. Attorney filed a motion
to intervene and a request for "a protective order staying discovery
pending the disposition of the related criminal proceedings."380 The
United States was concerned that "the upshot of compelling Feiner's
testimony would be the granting of insight to the criminal defendants
into the government's case against them ... [contrary to] the rules
governing discovery in a criminal case."3 8 1
In considering the U.S. Attorney's motion, the bankruptcy court,
citing Justice Cardozo's opinion in Landis v. North American Co.,382
first determined that it had the power to stay discovery regardless of
373. Id. at 1179.
374. See, e.g., In re Good, 131 B.R. 121, 127 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990); In re Marceca,
131 B.R. 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
375. See, e.g., In re Tower Metal Alloy Co., 188 B.R. 954, 957 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
376. 78 B.R. 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).




381. Id. at 710.
382. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
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whether the issue was raised by a party or by the court on its own
motion.
IThe power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be
done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests
and maintain an even balance.3 8 3
To do this, the court employed a five-part test and considered the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in continuing expedi-
tiously with the litigation, and the prejudice to the plaintiff due to any
delay caused by the stay; (2) the burden the stay would impose on the
defendants; (3) the efficient use of judicial resources, and convenience
to the court; (4) the interests of other persons who were not parties to
the litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in both the pending
criminal and civil litigation.3 8 4
Taking each of these factors into account, the court in Ahead By A
Length concluded that issuing a stay would be appropriate. First, the
court held that allowing the criminal case to conclude before continu-
ing with the adversary proceeding actually would make the plaintiffs
pursuit of her case easier. Second, the defendants would not be
harmed because the court stayed all civil proceedings to allow the de-
fendants to complete discovery at an appropriate time. Third, grant-
ing the stay and allowing the criminal case to conclude first would be a
great benefit to the bankruptcy court's resources, "for many of the is-
sues here will be disposed of in that proceeding whereas if [the adver-
sary proceeding] proceeded first... much pertinent information would
probably be withheld."385 Fourth, the U.S. Attorney had a significant
interest in seeing the adversary proceeding stayed to ensure that the
defendants in the criminal case did not discover more of the govern-
ment's case against them than they were entitled to under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.38 6 Finally, the public interest in having
the criminal case go forward outweighed any such interest in the ad-
383. In re Ahead By A Length, Inc., 78 B.R. 708, 710 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)(citations
omitted).
384. Id. at 713 (citing White v. Mapco Gas Prods., 116 F.R.D. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1987);
Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 660 F. Supp. 1494, 1497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See also
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902-03 (9th Cir.
1989)(quoting Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc.,
87 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1980)); In re Tower Metal Alloy Co., 188 B.R. 954, 956
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995)(noting the foregoing factors, but choosing not to apply
them "in a formalistic, mechanical fashion').
385. In re Ahead By A Length, Inc., 78 B.R. 708, 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
386. Id. See also id. at 710-13 (discussing in detail the propriety of using civil discov-
ery to avoid the restrictions on criminal discovery).
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versary proceeding. The court then stayed the bankruptcy proceeding
for six months pending disposition of the criminal case.3 8 7
In In re Ross,388 the bankruptcy court applied the same factors, but
reached a different result. In that case, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) asked the court to stay indefinitely a nondischargeability action
brought against it by the debtors, pending the completion of a criminal
investigation involving the debtors. The court began its analysis with
the third factor, noting that
the IRS has requested a stay until both the criminal investigation and any
criminal proceedings are completed. The IRS has not estimated how much
time this would involve, and has not limited its request for a stay. Such an
indefinite request for a stay puts the IRS, and not this Court, in control of the
case. It detrimentally affects the Court's ability to control its docket. It indefi-
nitely deprives the debtors of the "fresh start" central to bankruptcy policy,
without even requiring the IRS to appear in court or show a prima facie case
of nondischargeability. Given that the amount of any claim the IRS may pos-
sess against the debtors is also apparently undetermined, a stay could deprive
creditors of the estate of a remedy for an extensive period of time....
Judicial economy is also relevant to this factor. If this proceeding is stayed
and debtors are convicted in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the debtors
may be collaterally estopped with regard to those matters determined in the
criminal proceeding... The result might be a need for only one trial (the
criminal case), instead of two trials regarding the same matter. Where the
criminal proceedings have not even culminated in an indictment, however,
such judicial economy is speculative, and entitled to less weight.3 8 9
Returning to the first factor, the court then observed that staying
the adversary proceeding in the manner requested by the IRS would
burden the debtors by suspending indefinitely their right to a determi-
nation of the extent to which the IRS's claim was nondischargeable
and the debtor's right to a "fresh start."39 0 With respect to the second
factor, the court recognized that allowing the adversary proceeding to
go forward would burden the IRS, both because the debtors might be
able to discover information regarding the IRS's case that they would
not be able to discover in a criminal case, and because the debtors
might be able to limit the IRS's ability to discover information regard-
ing their case by asserting the Fifth Amendment. It discounted this
burden, however, because "[w]eighing against this impact is its com-
pletely hypothetical nature at this point; so far as the record indicates,
neither side has sought discovery."3 9 '
387. Apparently overlooked by both the parties and the court in In re Ahead By A
Length was that Feiner did not appear to have had a very strong Fifth Amend-
ment argument. Having already pled guilty to the offenses for which his alleged
coconspirators were facing both civil and criminal liability, the likelihood that his
testimony would have incriminated him seems remote. See In re Litton, 74 B.R.
557, 559 (Bankr. C.D. ]M. 1987).
388. 162 B.R. 860 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
389. Id. at 861-62 (citations omitted).
390. Id. at 861.
391. Id. at 862.
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In analyzing the fourth factor, the court looked to the interests of
the debtors' other creditors, who could not be paid until the amount of
the IRS's claim was determined. The court found this to be a substan-
tial burden. Finally, with respect to the fifth factor, the court ac-
knowledged that ordinarily the public interest in law enforcement
exceeds any private interest in pursuing a civil action. But, the court
noted that "[tihe public interest in a bankruptcy proceeding is not in-
substantial."39 2 The court went on to say that "delay in determining
the IRS's claim will not merely adversely impact on the debtors; it will
prevent any recovery to all of the creditors of the debtor."39 3
Not surprisingly, the court then denied the IRS's motion for a stay.
In doing so, however, the court indicated that protective orders under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7026 would be liberally granted. Further, if either party
could not complete discovery, whether because of such a protective or-
der or the debtors' invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the court would
entertain a renewed motion for a stay.3 94
While a bankruptcy court may be reluctant to stay an entire bank-
ruptcy proceeding until a parallel criminal proceeding is resolved,
many bankruptcy judges may be willing to exercise their inherent
power to manage their docket in such a way as to afford the party
requesting the stay some limited period of time to try to resolve or
conclude the criminal proceeding. Given such an opportunity, the re-
luctant witness may wish to consider whether a grant of immunity is a
possible means of resolving the impasse.
XI. IMMUNITY
A proper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not in every instance guarantee the right to remain
silent. An individual may be granted immunity from prosecution pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001 to 6005, which apply to bankruptcy cases,
both by their own terms and by their incorporation in 11 U.S.C. § 344.
Once granted immunity, the individual may be compelled to testify
regarding matters that would have been incriminating because "if the
criminality has already been taken away, the [Fifth] Amendment
ceases to apply."3 95
If the U.S. Attorney determines that the testimony of an individual
who has invoked, or is likely to invoke, the Fifth Amendment is neces-
sary to the public interest, she may ask the district court for an order
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id- at 863.
395. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441,448 (1972); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956); Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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requiring the individual to testify.3 96 Upon such request, the district
court "shall issue. . . an order requiring such individual to give testi-
mony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination."3 97 In that
event, however, the government may not use the testimony or any in-
formation directly or indirectly derived from it against the individual
in any criminal case other than a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or other failure to comply with the order.398
The immunity provided by such an order is "use immunity," not
"transactional immunity."3 99 The question of whether this more lim-
ited form of immunity sufficiently protects an individual's Fifth
Amendment rights was decided by the Supreme Court in Kastigar v.
United States.400 The Court held that the practice of compelling testi-
mony after a grant of use immunity is constitutional.401 Writing for
the majority, Justice Powell explained that "[t]ransactional immunity,
which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which
the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably
broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege."40 2 Im-
munity, to Powell, was not synonymous with amnesty.40 3 The Fifth
Amendment, he noted, protects a person from being compelled to tes-
tify against himself-to keep his own words from being used against
him. Justice Powell reasoned that use immunity was sufficient to
achieve this goal.
Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived
directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the
prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect,
and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of
criminal penalties on the same witness.
4 0 4
If the government prosecutes a person who has been granted immu-
nity, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that the evi-
dence against the witness came from an "independent, legitimate
source."40 5
The Department of Justice has specific guidelines governing re-
quests for a court order compelling the testimony of, or the production
396. 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1994).
397. Id. § 6003(a).
398. Id. § 6002.
399. See S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-.AN. 5787, 5829; H.R.
REP. No. 95-595 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6288-89.
400. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Kastigar decision was a 5-2 decision, with Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist taking no part.
401. Separate dissents were filed by Justice Douglas, id. at 462-67, and Justice Mar-
shall, id. at 467-71.
402. Id. at 453.
403. Id. at 462.
404. Id. at 453.
405. Id. at 460 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964)).
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of documents by, a person who has asserted a valid Fifth Amendment
privilege use of immunity.406 An attorney for the United States must
consider all relevant factors in assessing whether a grant of immunity
is in the public interest, including, but not limited to the following:
1. the importance of the investigation or prosecution to effective enforcement
of the criminal laws;
4 0 7
2. the value of the testimony or information to the investigation or
prosecution;4 08
3. the likelihood of prompt and full compliance with a compulsion order, and
the effectiveness of available sanctions if there is no such compliance; 40 9
4. the person's relative culpability in connection with the offense being inves-
tigated or prosecuted, and the person's history of criminal activity;410
5. the possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling
the testimony or production of information;4 1 1
6. the likelihood of adverse collateral consequences to the person if testi-
mony or production of information is compelled;4 12 and
7. whether the witness for whom immunity is being considered is a close
relative of the person against whom the testimony is being sought.4 13
After considering each of the foregoing factors and any others that are
relevant, an Assistant U.S. Attorney must first seek the U.S. Attor-
ney's permission to refer the matter to an Assistant Attorney General
(AAG),414 and then must obtain the approval of the AAG for the Crim-
inal Division or the AAG for the division of the Department of Justice
accountable for the case.41 5 Finally, if an AAG other than the AAG for
the Criminal Division approves the request, he must also obtain the
approval of the AAG for the Criminal Division.416 The Assistant U.S.
Attorney may then file the necessary motion in the district court.417
In a bankruptcy case, if a debtor refuses to testify after a grant of
immunity, the court can deny the debtor a discharge.418 In addition,
406. U.S. Dm'T OF JusTicE, UrmED STATES ATromiVs MAu AL § 9-23.110 to -310
(1992).
407. Id. § 9-23.210(A).
408. Id. § 9-23.210(B).
409. Id. § 9-23.210(C).
410. Id. § 9-23.210(D).
411. Id. §§ 9-23.210(E), 9-23.212.
412. Id. § 9-23.210(F).
413. In this situation, immunity will not be sought unless 'specific justification" exists.
Id. § 9-23.211.
414. Id. § 9-23.110. An attorney assigned to a Department of Justice litigation divi-
sion must follow the procedure outlined in id. § 9-23.120.
415. Id. § 9-23.100. On the civil side, the authority to initially approve such requests
has been given to the AAG in charge of the Civil Rights, Antitrust, Land and
Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions. Id. § 9-23.130.
416. Id. § 9-23.130.
417. Id. § 9-23.310.
418. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(B) (1994).
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as discussed above, a debtor or a nondebtor witness can be held in
contempt of court under such circumstances. 419
XII. CONCLUSION
Participants in the bankruptcy process who are hesitant to make a
full and complete disclosure of their financial affairs may be con-
fronted with many difficult choices. An uninformed or ill-advised deci-
sion can have serious consequences, including the loss of the
protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment and the denial of bank-
ruptcy relief. An understanding of the concepts discussed above, in-
cluding invocation, waiver, adverse inferences, other negative
consequences, and immunity, should assist bankruptcy practitioners
in counseling their clients when they are confronted with these diffi-
cult choices.
419. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir.
1984).
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